The Mexican military and political transition by Bedingfield, Robin Claire
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1992-12
The Mexican military and political transition
Bedingfield, Robin Claire







SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
a. SECURITY cTaSSIfTCaTOE AUTHORITY
lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
Unclassified
D ISTR IBUTION/ AVaILaWLITY 6F REpoRT
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
2b. dECLaSSIKICATION/dOWNC.RAdINg' STHEdTEE
PERFORMING oRGaNIZaTION KEFoTTT NUto&ERis, T.—MONITORING ORC-aNI^aTIoN REPORT nTOEeTO









6c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000




PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENT IFICATION NUMBERla. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING
ORGANIZATION
8c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code)
&. OFFICE SYMBOL
(If Applicable}
16. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBEkS
PROGRAM
ELEMENT NO.
TITLE (Include Security Classification)
















IT. DATE OF REF^ear, monttuaay)
December 1992
K SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
____________^
W. Sl"B JECT TERMS (continue on reverse ifnecessary and identify by block number)vr.
"fTElTT
COsaTI CODES
GToW SUBGROUP Mexico, Civil-Military Relations, Latin America, Political
Transition, Democratization, U.S.-Mexican Relations
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary ana identity by block number)
This thesis assesses the future of Mexican civil-military relations. Mexico is unique among Latin American nations for
its professionalized and depoliticized military. While the Mexican Armed Forces have shunned an active role in politics since
1940, they continue to rely on the hegemonic political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI, for power and
prestige. This dictates a close and mutually-supportive working relationship. Within the next 20 years, however, the PRI is
likely to lose its hegemonic position to increasing political opposition, severely straining the military's 60-year tradition of
loyalty to both its Constitution and party. The military will be pressured to take on a more dynamic political role with the
demise of its long-standing patron. This thesis demonstrates that the Mexican Armed Forces are likely to resist this
temptation to repoliticize.




21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Scott D. Tollefson







dd form i47i, U Mar sTAPRednionmayTeiiseaunuTeMausted
All other editions are obsolete
T260203
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The Mexican Military And Political Transition
by
Robin Claire Bedingfield
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Mary Washington College, 1981
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of





This thesis assesses the future of Mexican civil-military relations. Mexico is unique
among Latin American nations for its professionalized and depoliticized military. While
the Mexican Armed Forces have shunned an active role in politics since 1940, they continue
to rely on the hegemonic political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institutional, or PRI, for
power and prestige. This dictates a close and mutually-supportive working relationship.
Within the next 20 years, however, the PRI is likely to lose its hegemonic position to
increasing political opposition, severely straining the military's 60-year tradition of loyalty
to both its Constitution and party. The military will be pressured to take on a more
dynamic political role with the demise of its long-standing patron. This thesis demonstrates
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis examines the challenges Mexico's armed forces
will race as the country's ruling party loses its hegemony to
growing political opposition. This transition will probably
occur at the presidential level within the next 2 years,
severely straining the military's tradition of loyalty both to




and to the Republic. The military will be pressured to
take on a more dynamic political role with the loss of its
benefactor of 60 years, the PRI president. This thesis focuses
on the likely responses of Mexico's military to this
transition, demonstrating through the application of Wayne
Cornelius and Ann Craig's model that Mexico's armed forces
will resist both internal and external pressures to
repoliticize
.
The thesis begins with a review and application of Latin
American civil-military literature to modern Mexico. This is
followed by a brief analysis of the Mexican Revolution (1911-
1917) and the high political profile of early post-
Revolutionary^ military leaders. Analysis of the military
presidents' voluntary subordination of the armed forces to
civil rule follows, laying the groundwork for an examination
of the potential for and probability of military intervention.
The crux of this work is the modification and application
of Cornelius and Craig's four scenarios for Mexico's future as
VI
presented in their 19 91 monograph, The Mexican Political
"-" r" ~ rri kD Transit ion San Diego: ienter for 'J.: .-Mexican
Studies, Univ. of Ca. i Initially these scenarios v/ere not
applied to the military. This thesis, however, analyzes the
scenarios in considerably more detail. Each scenario is
presented on a rontinuum of likelihood for military
repoliticization, from the most to least likely. Each is then
divided into its basic factors and the military response to
each factor is predicted, based on the history, motivations
and self -percept ions of Mexico's military leadership.
The first of these four scenarios is Political Closure.
Its definition includes economic crisis through failure of the
Mexico's open-market model. The political and social costs of
choosing to close Mexico's political system in order to
maintain hegemony are judged in this thesis to be excessive,
even for an embattled PRI . Political closure is thus an
extremely unattractive and unlikely political alternative.
Still, it remains the scenario most capable of precipitating
a military split from the PRI government and subsequent
military repoliticization.
The second scenario, Immobilism, is somewhat more
politically credible. Characterized by political impasse and
government freeze, immobilism effectively stalemates both the
PRI and opposition parties. The likelihood of immobilism in
Mexico is greater than that of political closure, but remains
VI
1
relatively remote. The scenario :arries some decreased
potential for renewed military acnivism.
The chird scenario, Modernized Authoritarianism,
illustrates the most: viable PRI response to an impending loss
of the presidency, and is identified by government reversion
to harsher measures. While resulting in a revitalized PRI, it
could throw military loyalty into a quandary. The armed forces
would most likely support the PRI unless tasked to physically
impose PRI will on a recalcitrant public. This thesis
establishes modernized auchoritariamsm as nhe most likely
scenario when PRI political hegemony is threatened. It carries
a slightly increased potent ial for military- repolit icization
.
The last and most politically liberal scenario, Limited
Power Sharing, posits a PRI agenda of free elections to
determine local and state representation while ensuring
continued PRI hegemony at the national level. This scenario
can ensure only short-term political capital for the PRI, and
thus remains an improbable option for the PRI. Limited power
sharing entails the least threat of remilitarization.
This thesis addresses both Mexico's democratic reform and
political stability as the next 20 years pose a myriad of
social, political and economic changes. How the PRI party
leadership responds to its political transition from hegemony
to dominance will be critical in deciding the future political
role of the country's armed forces. The thesis demonstrates
VI 11
that Mexico's military leadership will most likely reject an
increased political role, preferring to maintain subordination




Mexico is unique fimong Latin American nations for its
professionalized and ie-poiit icized military. VJhiie the
Mexican Armed Forces have shunned an active role in politics
for over 5 years, their continued reliance on the civilian
government for power and prestige has dictated a close and
mutually-supportive working relationship. As such, the Mexican
Army, Navy, and Air Force maintain a viable but non-decision
making role in politics, supporting the one-party government
system which has ruled uninterrupted since 1929. Despite a
negligible international military role, Mexico's Armed Forces
have managed to professionalize and maintain a traditionally
military, rather than constabulary presence. This role may be
threatened, however, by the emergence of new and
unconventional military missions.
This thesis begins with a review of the applicable modern
civil-military literature in Chapter II and an overview of
Mexico's post-Revolutionary political and military evolution
in Chapter III. Chapter IV briefly sketches current relations
between Mexico's civil government and military leadership, and
explores both the probability of and potential grounds for
intervention. Thus the stage is set for Chapter V to focus on
the political future of Mexico's military. The primary peril
to continued military subordination under a changing civil
vernment is che strain Mexico's firmed forces will face .5
the hegemonic Parvido Revol . : inario Inscizv.ci : n 11 PRI)"
loses 11s position : f preeminence. Increasing political
opposition and growing public support for the conservative
Parcido ie Accicn Nacional 1 PAN ) ' find the liberal factions as
represented y the coalition Parcido Revolucionarlo
Democracico ( PRD) ; will continue to grow.
At some point in the future, arguably within the next 2
years, the PRI will probably lose its long-standing residence
in the Presidential Palace. At that time the question will be
raised, who will the military support? Will it follow the
precepts of the Constitution and support a non-PRI government?
Or will its loyalty to the PRI, so long identified as the true
embodiment of the Revolution, outweigh fealty to the nation?
The military's reaction to this probable demise of the
predominant political power in Mexico can be analyzed and
national Revolutionary- Party.
: National Action Party.
: Revolutionary Democratic Party. The PRD has emerged from the
leftist coalition known as the National Democratic Front, or FDN,
which won unprecedented popular support for an opposition candidate
in the 1983 presidential election. For an excellent analysis of the
rise of the FDN, see Peter H. Smith, "The 1988 Presidential
Succession in Historical Perspective," especially the section
entitled "The Campaign." Mexico's Alternative Political Futures.
Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith ( eds )
.
(San Diego: Center for U.S. -Mexican Studies, Univ. of Ca, 1989.)
pp. 403-411.
anticipated by vising an expanded version of the four scenarios
formulated by Wayne Cornelius and Ann Craig in "heir _991
monograph. These have been developed, modified, r-.nci replied
co 'ivii-military relations. The pocentiai for a re-
politicization of the military is .addressed in the context of
each scenario, as is the role of Mexico's military in the
future of Mexican politics. Chapter VI then assesses both the
historic and current levels of U.S. influence on the Mexican
military and explores the implications of a Mexican
remilitarization on "J. J. -Mexican relations.
In order to fully comprehend the political implications of
the threat posed by a loss of PRI hegemony and the military's
scope of options in dealing with it, an understanding of
applicable civil-military theory is required, as is a working
knowledge of the political evolution of Mexico's post-
Revolutionary military. These are the subjects of the next two
chapters
.
Wayne A. Cornelius and Ann L. Craig. The Mexican Political
System in Transition
. (San Diego: Center for U.S. -Mexican Studies,
Univ. of Ca, 1991 . )
II. SETTING THE THEORETICAL STAGE
This chapter will focus first on 'defining the term
"military prof essionaiizat ion . " The second section will then
review relevant portions of existing civil-military literature
and apply it to post -Revolutionary Mexico. The third and final
portion will demonstrate the validity of both Mexico's
classification as maintaining a professionalized military and
the pertinence of the reviewed literature to Mexico's unique
case
.
A. DEFINING MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION
Perhaps the most important baseline to establish early in
this thesis is a working definition of military
prof essionalization. The term has been used to encompass a
wide variety of traits and institutions. Edwin Lieuwen writes
that a professionalized military is a depolit icized military,
but this broad definition does not take into account the
expectations and motivations which are part of any
professionalized armed force. Frederick Munn proposes
Jose Luis Pineyro writes of the "lack of agreement :ver what
constitute ( s ) "prof essionaiizat ion" " of the Mexican armed forces
and the variables which must be taken into account. See his essay,
"The Modernization of the Mexican Armed Forces." Democracy Under
Siege: New Military Power in Latin America . Agosto Varas (ed) . (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1989.) p. 125.
professionalism is based on "the propensity and willingness to
apply solutions cased on a deeply traditional military ethos
to national problems," and the depth of this commitment is
reflective :-i the ""bought and self -percept ion of the officer
corps." For the purposes of this thesis, a proressionalized
military is defined as one which has a defined rank structure
separate from the civil government hierarchy, maintains a
viable professional training and education program, and allows
advancement on military merit rather than political
connections
.
After the Revolution, Mexico's military underwent a
profound change, becoming smaller and more professionalized,
and eventually totally subordinated under the "far-reaching
powers"'" of the president as commander-in-chief. Military
professionalism has in the past been at least partially
defined as
decreased political intervention. The idea is that
professionalism leads to a military esprit de corps, a
dedication to pursuit of purely military activities, and
an eschewing of political activity on both moral and
practical grounds... (T)his intense military activity
Frederick M. Nunn . "On the Role of the Military in Twentieth
Century Latin America: The Mexican Case." The Modern Mexican
Military: A Reassessment . David Ronfeldt (ed). (San Diego: Center
for U.S. -Mexican Studies, Univ. of Ca, 1984.) pp. 44-45.
Nunn in Ronfeldt (1984). p. 45.
Adrian J. English. The Armed Forces of Latin America .
(London: Jane's Publishing Co, Ltd, 1984.) p. 302.
keeps the ctrmed forces so I usy that they have no leisure
r c r pci i t i ca 1 rni s ch i e f .
That is, :ne expected result: of professionalism is a decreased
probability of political intervention. John Johnson agrees,
adding that the prof essionalizat ion of militaries makes them
less attractive to elites seeking a potential source of
power .
•
In addition, an important component of defining
professionalism in the Mexican case is the general conviction
of military officers :hac while they are servants of the
political system, they remain morally above its inherent
corruption. This translates to an unwillingness to soil the
armed services with the "dirt" of politics, and a separation
of military and political powers. This has proven advantageous
to both the armed forces and the ?RI in promoting a
subordinated and professionalized military.
The physical downsizing of the armed forces by successive
post-Revolutionary Mexican Presidents, linked with their
depoliticization, has resulted in a modern military which has
Edwin Lieuwen "Depoliticization of the Mexican Revolutionary
Army, 1915-1940." In Ronfeldt (1984.) pp. 53-54. Lieuwen notes that
his theory of decreased threat levels for political intervention
with increased levels of military professionalism is a contentious
one, as has been noted here.
John L. Johnson. "Political Change in Latin America: The
Emergence of the Middle Sectors." Promise of Development: Theories
of Change in Latin America . Peter F. Klaren and Thomas J. Bossert
(eds)
.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.) p. 98.
little interest in assuming the reins of political power. The
trend continued until the 1980s, when the Mexican military was
increasingly tasked with internal, and non-traditional
missions, and the civilian elite accepted this as proper and
desirable behavior. In 1989, when Bryan Keiley wrcte, " ( t ) he
Mexican armed forces are ever increasing their level of
professionalism," 1 ' the stresses and strains of internal
threats and political competition were already beginning to
affect the professional performance of the military. This must
be considered a contributing factor behind the increased
military-as-constabulary involvement in the 1988 elections, as
will be shown in Chapter III.
B. APPLYING THE LITERATURE
Mexico is unique among Latin American nations in its
development of a professionalized, co-opted military. Much of
the existing literature on Latin American civil-military
relations has ignored Mexico because of this uniqueness. Juan
Rial admonishes his academic colleagues who tend to generalize
about Latin American militaries and their political roles, and
calls for individual consideration of each nation's
1
1
Eryan C. Keiley. "The Future of the Mexican Political
System." (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca; 1989.)
Unpublished, p. 56.
situation." While little has been written directly dealing
with modern Mexico's nvii -military relations, much of the
existing, broader literature can be applied.
Munn maintains " ' t i here is simply no consensus on the
present role of the Mexican military. "• Indeed, disputes exist
among experts in the field on many aspects, including whether
professionalized militaries are more or less likely to
intervene in domestic government affairs. Samuel Huntington,'
Adolfo Zinser," Edwin Lieuwen" and Louis Goodman' are among
those who support the theory that "increasing professionalism
correlates with decreasing political intervention."-' These
' : Juan Rial. "The Armed Forces and the Question of Democracy. "
The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations
in Latin America . Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson and Juan
Rial (eds). (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990.)
; Nunn in Ronfeidt (1984.) p. 35.
i4 Samuel P. Huntington gives his prescription for "Curbing
Military Power (and) Promoting Military Professionalism" in his
1990 book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century
. (Norman and London: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 199 0.) p.
251-254. He also discussed the political role of professional
soldiers in The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Poli tics of
Civil-Military Relations . (Cambridge, Mass: Howard Univ. Press,
1957 . ;
Adolfo Aguilar Zinser. "Civil-Military Relations in Mexico.
"
In Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial. p. 222.
Lieuwen in Ronfeidt (1984.) p. 53. Lieuwen notes that Alfred
Vagts and Samuel Huntington agree with his thesis that "increasing
professionalism correlates with decreasing political intervention.
Louis W. Goodman. "The Military and Democracy." In Goodman,
Mendelson, and Rial.
La Lieuwen in Ronfeidt (1984). p. 53.
Latin Americanises would agree that Mexico's armed forces are
not likely to intervene in government despite a potential loss
of prestige and high-level access because they do not; wish to
jeopardize their military professionalism. The opposing school
of thought includes such prominent names as Alfred Stepan, l
Guiiiermo ' Donnell
,
:,: and Samuel Finer, ~ : who would postulate
that it is precisely such professionalism which endangers the
continuance of civil rule. Each of these men addresses certain
factors in his writing at variance with his fellow political
scientists. 0' Donnell, for example rontends that while
professionalized militaries are less likely to intervene in
politics than their less capable compatriots, once in power a
professionalized force is more likely to retain an overt
political role. Stepan agrees that even professionalized Latin
American armies which are consumed with internal security
missions, as Mexico's are, are more likely to intervene in
politics than are militaries focused on external missions.
The former school of thought was in vogue until broken by
the disillusionment which accompanied the 1960s
Ibid. p. 54. Also see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan ( eds )
.




Guiiiermo 0' Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter and Laurence
Whitehead (eds)
. Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative
Perspectives
. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986.)
These three names are also cited by Lieuwen as disagreeing
with his own thesis. Lieuwen in Ronfeldt (1984.) p. 53-54.
remilitarization of much of Latin America. Abraham ^owenthai
writes :. z "he literature prior i: that time,
(i)t was assumed (or at least hoped) that military
involvement in Latin America [sic] politics would iecline
as socioeconomic modernization and mobilization occurred,
as armies became more "professional, " and as the influence
of announced United States support for democratic regimes
made itself felt.-"
He also maintains this was further disproved by yet another
"wave" of Latin American remilitarization in che 1980s.
Augosto Varas contends that it is professionalism which causes
politicized Latin American militaries to "retreat to the
barracks"" when faced with a crisis of mission: In this
scenario, difficult political decisions render a ruling
military unable to reconcile its military and government
missions. The military leadership thus eventually backs away





Imser and David Ronfeidt hold that the Mexican military
has no political aspirations of its own, but could conceivably
:: Abraham F. Lowenthal. "Armies and Politics in Latin America:
Introduction to the First Edition." Armies and Politics in Latin
America. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch ( eds ) . (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1986.) p. 4.
Augosto Varas. "Civil-Military Relations in a Democratic
Framework." In Goodman, Mendelson and Rial. p. 202.
- 4 Ibid.
10
be used by another entity (perhaps a disaffected civilian
elite?) to act as a surrogate to usurp government power. Alden
Cunningham agrees that "nothing short of total governmental
collapse would cause the Mexican military to take the reigns
[sic] of power which it relinquished to civilian control in
the 1940s . "-
According to Zinser, the potential for military repression
increases when militaries are tasked with domestic missions."
This acts as a deprofessionalizmg influence, demoralizing the
armed forces and giving at least the perception of pitting
civilian authorities against rheir own military. Such a
failure to accommodate the military's future needs may be
studies in terms of such frameworks of understanding as Irma
Adelman's theory of "rank disequilibrium.'"17 Adelman maintains
that when the relative position of a social class or strata is
inequivalent with its political stature, it will seek its own
level of equilibrium.
One factor leading to civil destabilizat ion and the
subsequent polit icizat ion of Latin American militaries, as
:
- Lt . Col. Alden M. Cunningham. "Mexico's National Security
in the 1980s-1990s . " In Ronfeldt (1984.) p. 172.
-' Zinser in Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial. pp. 229-232.
- 7 Irma Adelman and Jairus M. Hihn. "Politics in Latin America:
A Catastrophe Theory Model." Journal of Conflict Resolution .
December 1982. p. 595. as noted by Kelley. p. 68.
11
seen by both Karen Remmer' and Huntington,-' is extreme
economic inequality. Mexico's PRI government has ztealt with
this in an original manner. It is generally accepted that the
potential for military and civil rebellion increases when a
society is rife with at least the percepcion of gross
inequality. This was the case in pre-Revolutionary Mexico,
with the distinction between the "haves" and the "have nots"
clear and virtually unbroachabie . Minimal opportunities for
social mobility were a great contributor to widespread peasant
support which fueled the Revolution. The inclusionary post-
Revolutionary system has, however, actively sought to
incorporate the disadvantaged sectors of its civil society,
thereby ensuring their loyalty and procuring a measure of
stability for the state. Huntington terms this "a new unifying
social myth and basis for legitimacy" 3 " provided by the Mexican
Revolution. Such an incorporation of many different social
sectors under one political party is unique to the Mexican
system, as it seeks to co-opt and provide some level of social
equality for all of its citizens.
Karen L. Remmer. Military Rule in Latin America . (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1989.)
Samuel P. Huntington. "Will More Countries Become
Democratic?" Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (7th Ed) . Roy
C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds) . (Pacific Grove, Ca
:
BrooksXCole Publishing Co, 1990.) pp. 81-100.
Samuel P. Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies .
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968.) p. 317.
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Remmer
' s association : r exclusionary regimes with low and
advanced socio-economic levels, ;md inclusionary regimes with
mid-level development :an be directly applied to Mexico's
civilian government. As -; result jf the Revolution and a
commitment to unification of the nation, the PRI has co-opted
as many sectors of civil society as possible and effectively
incorporated the military. This has resulted in the modern
inclusionary system perpetuated by the government and embraced
by its loyal servants, including the military.
C. MEXICO'S UNIQUE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Since its Revolution (1911-1917), Mexico's government has
acted independently of the traditional Latin American model in
its methods of ensuring the long-term success of its
authoritarian system. Through co-optation and incorporation,
Mexico's PRI government has allowed forces outside of
government circles to succeed in bringing about "policy
innovation... (and) marked changes in government policy
despite their largely closed system."' 1 With the advent of
widespread "industrialization, urbanization, and educational
attainment,"^ the probability that a military will assume an
exclusionary or oligarchical form declines in favor of an
Michael W. Foley. "Agenda for Mobilization: The Agrarian
Question and Popular Mobilization in Contemporary Mexico." Latin
American Research Review (LARR) , Volume 26, Number 2, 1991. p. 39.
:
~ Remmer
, p . 10 .
13
inclusionary system.
This may be applied to the PRI elites' 60-year history of
co-optation: While not a military government per se, Mexico's
post-Revolutionary authoritarian system has worked to preserve
its position by adapting and co-opting potential adversaries.
Ronfeldt views the Mexican military as retaining a "residual
political role, one of conflict management amidst
institutional crisis. "•• Arnaldo Vela suggests that the PRI
commitment to incorporation led to its acceptance of a minor
but legitimate limited power-sharing with opposition parties,
but that the PRI did not intend for the opposition to usurp
PRI hegemony." This commitment to corporatism, therefore, is
the instrument of the PRI ' s demise, and is of its own making.
Without this vehicle for assimilation of non-PRI supporters,
however, the legitimacy of the PRI itself would have been
undermined and its responsiveness to its constituency
diminished. The responsiveness of Mexico's political elite has
been appropriately characterized as
Nunn in Ronfeldt (1984). p. 36. Here Nunn cites Ronfeldt '
s
earlier essay, "The Mexican Army and Political Order Since 1940."
Contemporary Mexico: Papers of the IV International Congress of
Mexican History
. James W. Wilkie, Michael C. Meyer, and Edna Monzon
de Wilkie ( eds ) . (Univ. of Ca Press, Berkeley; 1976.) He also cites
Howard F. Cline. Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960 . (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962.)
i4 Arnoldo Vela. "Dominant Parties in the Service of
Authoritarian Regimes: The Mexican PRI." (Los Angeles, September
1992.) Unpublished.
14
(L)argeiy preemptive: Elites respond to perceived public
demands in an effort to head off more explicit
disconcenc.
.
. co-opting existing opposition by imakingj
marginal adjustments and generous side oavments.
In the future this may not be so easy to accomplish, but it
has been a unique and extremely successful modus operandi for
over half a century.
To summarise, Mexico "provides us with an anomaly,"'"
remaining unique in that its government has proven willing and
able to continually maneuver, shifting programs and positions
as its civil support requires. In defining professionalism,
this chapter has provided a baseline for further discussion of
the role of Mexico's military in the country's political
future. The subsequent theoretical comparison of 1950s and
1960s Latin American civil-military literature with the
writings of more recent political scientists gives the student
a solid foundation from which to assess Mexico's impending
crisis, the loss of PRI hegemony. Lastly, this chapter has
clearly demonstrated the adaptability of the Mexican one-party
political system to changing circumstances.
Historically, this flexibility has been an asset to the
Foley in LARR , p. 41. Alan Knight makes a similar assessment
in his essay, "Mexico's Elite Settlement: Conjuncture and
Consequences.
" Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America
and Southern Europe
. John Higley and Richard Gunther ( eds ) . (New
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992.) pp. 113-145.
' Nunn in Ronfeldt (1984). p. 47.
15
PRI in maintaining its broad power base. Societies are, by
"heir nature, in a constant state n :hange, and Mexico is no
exception. The literature which has been applied in this brief
review shows that although the experts in the fields of
political science and :ivil-rnilitary relations io not
necessarily agree on a framework within which to study the
Mexican case, each contributes in some way to an understanding
of the whole. It is evident from their work that most believe
Mexican politics to be both unique and headed for a major
change. The historical perspective presented in the next
chapter will explore the factors of modern civil-military
relations, thus providing a basis for understanding the
changes Mexico will face into the 21st century.
16
III. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK - THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
For a country of Mexico's importance, its army is one of
the least studied in Latin America. Indeed the
contemporary Mexican military may be the most difficult
such institution to research in Latin America. Certainly
it is the most difficult national institution to research
in Mexico. . . Without new fieldwork the roles and
contributions of one of Mexico's most important national
institutions will likely remain the target of rumor more
than serious analysis.
It is true that little is known of the Mexican military.
The reason for this lack of information appears not to stem
from a lack of academic interest, but rather from an
institutionalized secrecy which pervades the military
structure. Even "routine activities" tend to be classified "as
highly sensitive and subject to security restrictions." 33 A
considerable amount of work has been done on the Mexican
government, yet despite its importance the military's
political position within that: system remains relatively
unknown
.
David F. Ronf eldt . "The Mexican Army and Political Order
Since 1940." In Ronfeldt (1934.) p. 68.
;i Stephen W. Wager. The Mexican Army. 1940-1982: The Country
Comes First . (Dissertation, Stanford Univ; 1992.) p. 6.
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A. THE EVOLUTION OP THE MILITARY IN POST- REVOLUTIONARY MEXICO
^he role of che military in Mexico's post -Revolutionary
restructuring has been minimal. This may have been saused by
che absence of external threats, .unci may also be partially due
to the PRI ' s long-standing commitments to non-intervention and
international self -determinism. Whatever the reason, Mexico
maintains "the least politicized military in Latin America,
the country relying implicitly on the United States for its
defence against external enemies."- The United States would
not permit an outside actor to draw Mexico into conflict, as
this would lead to instability on its own southern border. In
addition, Mexico's role in Central America has been such that
interstate conflicts have been resolved through political, not
military, means and thus have not escalated into warfare. 40 The
country's commitment to ideological plurality also reflects an
increased tolerance of differing doctrine in the state
governments of the region, provided legitimacy is maintained
through popular domestic consensus. Thus Mexico has kept its
role as a regional elder statesman and peacemaker without
relying on military enforcement of its will.
The distinctive social position of Mexico's military
English, p. 302
40 For a more detailed look at Mexico's role in the region, see
this author's recent essay, "Influencing Central America: Mexico as
a Regional Leader." (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca;
Spring 1992.) Unpublished.
forces is evident by any standard. Indeed, the entire
government represents "a unique :ase in Latin America of
stability and development, "" : due to the form and substance of
the post-Revolutionary state structure. The shape Mexico has
taken since its Revolution is singular in its precepts of
political inclusion. It is generally accepted that the long
and bloody Revolution did not significantly alter the social
or state structure: Government merely assumed a new, adaptable
form, able to coopt and incorporate large sectors of
previously disenfranchised Mexican society. Likewise, the
Revolution "did not destroy the authoritarian nature of
Mexican political life, it modernized it," 42 and the position
of the armed forces was modified from a "predatory" to a less
pervasive and more "irregular" role. 4
'
3
1. Generals as Presidents
In the aftermath of this Civil War, a new,
professional role was forged for Mexico's military by its
military presidents. For almost 3 years following the
Revolution, Mexican presidents were elected on the strength of
' Lorenzo Meyer. "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State
in Mexico.
" Authoritarianism in Mexico . Jose Luis Reyna and Richard
S. Wienert ( eds ) . (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human
Issues, 1977
. ) p. 10
.
42 Ibid. p. 4.
Edward J. Williams and Freeman J. Wright. Latin American
Politics: A Developmental Approach . (Palo Alto, Ca : Mayfield
Publishing Co, 1975.) p. 211.
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their reputations as military leaders. This occurred despite
the fact that their "repudiation :f raudillo politics. .
.
implied a civilian succession."" In fact, it was not until
1946 that a civilian president was elected. Although President
Lazaro Cardenas ( 1934-40) is considered the force behind
subordinating the Mexican military to the civil government,
the down-sizing of Mexico's armed forces actually began under
President Alvaro Obregon (1920-24).
In the early _l920s, Obregon cut military spending
virtually in half. In only two years, he sliced the military's
share of the federal budget from 61 to 35 percent. The number
of active duty enlisted army and navy men fell from 2 00,000 to
150,000, while the officer corps suffered even more severe
cuts - from 50,000 men to only 20,000. Presidents Calles and
Cardenas continued the trend, whittling an even smaller and
more professional military. Each of these presidents promoted
literacy and professional training programs for enlisted men,
as well as overseas professional and graduate-level education
for officers. Perhaps the most telling indicator
of the military's decline as a political institution is
its share of the federal government budget, which dropped
from 17 percent in 1940, to 5 to 6 percent in the 1970s,
;4 Knight in Higley and Gunther. p. 123
to 1-3 percent in the 1980s.'
In recent years even more "spartan budgets""" have been
imposed on the Mexican armed forces. The latest available
figures show recent military spending at its lowest point, 2.3
to 2 . 3 percent of Mexico's federal government expenditures in
1989, accounting for only .5 percent to .6 percent of GNP
.
4
These are among the lowest levels of military spending in the
world. In comparison, United States defense expenditures that
same year represented 25.5 percent of total federal government
spending and 5.8 percent of GNP.'
In the late 1930s, President Cardenas was rightly
concerned that conservative military officers could bring
considerable negative pressure to bear as his liberal land
reform usurped properties of wealthy elites. He was able to
45 Wayne A. Cornelius and Ann L. Craig. "Politics in Mexico."
Comparative Politics Today : A World View . Gabriel A. Almond and G.
Bingham Powell
,
jr. ( eds ) . (Scott, Foresman, and Company, Glenview,
111; 1988.) p. 467.
4i> Pineyro in Varas . p. 123.
47 The lower figures, 2.3 and .5 percent, are derived from
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers , 1990. (Washington,
D.C: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990.) p. 73, Table
1. The higher figures, 2.8 and .6 percent are derived from figures
cited by Mark S. Hoffman (ed) . The World Almanac and Book o f Facts,
1991 . (New York: Pharos Books, 1991.) p. 733.
48 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990 . p. 85,
Table 1. In addition, see Figure 17 on p. 20, entitled "Relative
Burden(s) of Military Expenditures-1989 , " which clearly
demonstrates the extremely low levels of military expenditures by
Mexico as compared to other nations of the world.
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defuse rhe issue, however, by further oooptmg the military
under the executive branch. A Brigadier General himself,
Cardenas "assiduously began ro :ultivate promising young
officers"" whose loyalty ro his liberal programs was
unquestionable. He raised military salaries, increased
benefits and revitalized education programs. In addition to
Cardenas' newly-implemented internal military reforms, these
measures served to assimilate once and for all the political
interests of the armed forces leadership into the popular
sector of the PRI
. Before that rime,
the fortunes of Mexico's military and political leadership
were so inextricably intertwined that it is difficult to




Cardenas thus completed the Mexican military's
depoliticization, and the armed forces were, in effect,
"neutralize (d) ..
. as a potential ally of the conservative
faction within the regime that opposed (Cardenas') reform
policies." Cardenas increased personal compensation for
officers who did not actively participate in the political
Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman. The Course of
Mexican History
. 4th Edition. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991.
p. 597 .
Roderic A. Camp. "Generals and Politicians in Mexico: A
Preliminary Comparison." In Ronfeldt (1984.) p. 108.
Cornelius and Craig in Almond and Powell, p. 466.
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process, and effectively removed the armed forces from
entering the public sector. His reorganization of the PRI
increased the power of the popular sector as a major source of
PRI support, which also helped to break the monopoly of the
generals on political cower.
In all, the "demilitarizing" of Mexican politics was
a long and arduous process, which culminated in the election
of Miguel Aleman Valdez, a civilian lawyer, in 1946. "' : Stephen
Wager rightly notes, however, that "the transfer of political
power to a civilian elite. . . could not have been accomplished
without a consensus to do so by the army itself." 3 ' The armed
forces have not sought an active political role or constituted
a viable threat to civil rule since that time, despite
economic crises and substantial internal mission realignment.
2. The Military as a Pillar of PRI Support
The social support base of the modern PRI consists of
three distinct socio-economic "pillars." The first is labor,
made up largely of urban, unionized workers, and represented
by the Confederacion de Trabaiadores de Mexico. * The second
is the peasant class, represented by the Cardenas- inspired
Confederacion Nacional Campesina. Lastly, the Confederacion
Zinser in Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial. pp. 219-236
C3 Wager
. p . 3 .
r4 The Mexican Workers' Confederation, or CTM.
The National Peasants' Confederation, or CNC
.
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Nacional ie Organizaciones Fopi.il3.res represents .small
business owners, government employees, and other members of
the middle class. While other organizations exist to represent
these same interests, these three groups largely constitute
the major party sectors. The military assumed an active role
as a fourth pillar of PRI support for a short time in the
early post -Revolutionary years, but by 1940 it was clearly
subordinated to the civil government . As its needs were
incorporated into popular sector, the military ceased to be
viable ris an external source of government support.
Looking even briefly at civilian support of the PRI,
several issues beg examination. First is the "most notable
feature of politics before 1987, (which) was the widespread
indifference of the population toward electoral processes.""
This changed markedly in 1988 as the Mexican public became
increasingly aware of the distinction between what was
promised by the PRI and what was actually provided. Party
loyalty remained greatest among the older generations and
less-educated, lower income Mexicans, while the conservative
opposition PAN found its "strongest support among the state's
The National Confederation of Popular Organizations, or
CNOP.
Tonatiuh Guillen Lopez. "The Social Bases of the PRI." In
Cornelius, Gentleman and Smith, p. 243. Also see Wayne A. Cornelius
and Ann L. Craig, "Politics in Mexico," in Almond and Powell for
further discussion of this issue.
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youth."- The nation's more educated increasingly represent a
"liberal political culture" in their support of the PAN, while
the uneducated "reflect traditional political culture with its
corporative negotiation and clientelism. " : ' The impact of this
polarization of Mexican society is a decline in the government
party's ability to rely on the virtually undivided support of
its three wide bases of civil support.
The PRI no longer can assure a carro completo, by
winning ail races for which it puts forth a candidate. .
.
(E)ven in 1987 the observed political attitudes of the
population did not correspond with electoral outcomes. The
poll results would lead us to expect a stronger showing
from the most important opposition party, the PAN. This
did not materialize. This inconsistency between
expectations and electoral outcome prompts us once again
to question the social legitimacy of the political
system. :
The PRI government can, for the present, rely on the
backing of the military, as shall be discussed more fully in
Chapter V. The general public's disaffection with the
:8 Survey results as reported by Lopez in Cornelius, Gentleman,
and Smith, p. 245.
" q Ibid. p. 254.
This phrase is used by Che author to note the important
victories of the PAN, which "altered the traditional 'carro
completo'" or total sweep of elections. The lengths to which the
PRI has gone to secure its dominance are also noted.
1,1 Lopez in Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith, p. 249. This
"inconsistency between expectations and... outcome" referred to by
Lopez is explored in depth in Chapter IV of this thesis, under the
section entitled "The J-Curve and Relative Deprivation."
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political system which -.-/as made clear in the 1 9 - : ind 1991
elections has not resulted in : i :ommensurate level of
opposition incorporation into the PRI government. Still, even
the official tallies show the percentage :f votes for
opposition candidates growing consistently. ~
The lack of interest assimilation resulting in these
lower voting percentages has forced the PRI to the verge of
becoming only a dominant party, as opposed to a hegemonic one.
Corresponding evidence shows the PRI ' s willingness to go to
extreme lengths, involving unprecedented repression, in order
to retain a dominant position. The 1988 presidential and 1991
and 1992 gubernatorial elections included massive electoral
fraud in the face of unparalleled political opposition. In
each of these elections, the government's willingness to use
the military as a strong constabulary force has been
demonstrated, ostensibly to keep social order, but also as a
clearly-visible emissary of the PRI.
3 . Military Subordination and Political Affiliation
The Mexican military was profoundly affected by
"Cardenismo . " Lieuwen depicts Cardenas as a true social
revolutionary, and doubts that The transition from military to
Several sources document the declining percentages of PRI
votes in Mexico's recent elections and the corresponding rise in
political opposition support. See Alberto Aziz Nassif, "Regional
Dimensions of Democratization" in Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith,
especially Figure 1, p. 89. Also see Tonatiuh Guillen Lopez in the
same volume, Table 1, p. 248 and Table 4, p. 259 and Cornelius and
Craig, Table 1, p. 65 and Table 2, p. 67.
riviiian presidents could have been accomplished wichouE his
influence. This has promote i H inEingr.cn to agree that, " (i)n
terms :z policy Che regime r. Cardenas was the second Mexican
Revolution . " "
The imprint made by Cardenas on the modern military
structure remains. While many of the changes were not popular
with military leaders at the time, the generals remained loyal
to their president in return for relative autonomy in
operations and training. They also received virtually carte
blanche, :iirect access tc the ; resident, yet were able to
retain sufficient distance from political involvement to
preserve a reputation as unsullied and above the political
f rav
.
The post-revolutionary professional officers in charge of
the defense establishment showed no inclination to mingle
in politics ever again. To do so would be to commit career
suicide, politically as well as militarily.
This was a major step in the prof essionalizat ion of the
Mexican armed forces, which has given the modern military
leadership both a position within and access to the Mexican
political hierarchy.
Lieuwen in Ronfeldt (1984.)
Huntington (1968.) p. 321.
Lieuwen in Ronfeldt (1984.) p. 61
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Today, Mexican officers of all services are expected
not only t o pursue advanced education, but are also assumed to
support and uphold the ideals 3f the Revolution. As such,
individual membership in the FRI is virtually assured. Little
is known of the pressures within Che military system ro join
the government part'/, although the late Robert Wesson
contended that "the typical Mexican military officer oonsiders
himself removed from political circles and a political
career." While this may be true, Jose Luis Pineyro is also
oredible in observing,
(i)t is rumored that officers who request permission to
join a party other than the PRI are given an indefinite
leave of absence, which virtually amounts to being
discharged from the service. Rumor also has it that
rebellious officers are denied credit for housing and
other benefits.
B. PROFESSIONAL. DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY STRUCTURE
Mexico's Military Service Act of 1942, still in effect,
requires that all male citizens over the age of 13 receive
military training under the auspices of the National Service
Brigades. While this organization provides only nominal
training to its members, the number of reserve forces
available for call-up greatly outnumbers the active duty
Robert Wesson. The Latin American Military Institution . (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1986.) p. 161.
Pineyro in Varas
. o. 12 6.
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military contingent of 154,000. As of 1984, "5% of active
iuty forces were Army, _."• were Mavy, rind the remaining 6%
were Air Force.
The secretary of iefense, responsible for the Army and Air
Force, 'ilia, the secretary of the navy ccupy cabinet positions
and are "personally selected by the President." All
promotions to the ranks of general ar admiral must also be
approved by the president
.
The same applies it the appointment and removal of
military zone commanders. . . the chairman and vice chairman
of the general staff, and the inspector general. The
president must also give his consent before any military
plans may be implemented.
" Personalismo" thus continues to play a large part in
high-level military positions, much as "camarillas" ~ do within
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990 . Table
1, p. 73, shows the rapid increase in active duty military forces
between 1979 and 1939 as Mexico's modernization program was
implemented. Despite the 19S2 economic crisis, military strength
was maintained and only showed one year of decrease (1984) . Figures
for reserve force strength are placed at 1.5 million in 1985. See
English, p. 298.
Maj . Stephen J. Wager. "Basic Characteristics of the Modern
Mexican Military." In Ronfeidt (1984.) p. 39.
Wager in Ronfeidt (1984.) p. 90.
Pmeyro m Varas . p. 12 3.
Camarillas are defined by Cornelius and Craig as political
cliques. Membership in an eminent politician's camarilla is
essential to a successful political career in Mexico. See Cornelius
and Craig, pp. 39-44, for their analysis of "Camarillas and
2 9
the civilian government: structure.
A notable trend in the development of the depoliticized,
modern military is the decline in the number :i iff iters
serving as state governors tronn half (15 of 21 luring the
Aleman sexemo, 1946-52) co only one or two since 1970. The
PRI government has actively discouraged political involvement
by transferring its officers regularly, thus avoiding strong
personal attachments to a particular region, and by
prohibiting political involvement as a military member. By
lav/, government participation must be undertaken as a private
citizen. The Mexican Constitution stipulates the president as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It subjugates the
military to civil law, which is also headed by the president
in his role as head of the state legal system.
1. The Role of Education
Virtually all Mexican military officers are graduates
of the three service academies. The influence of this
education and four-year exercise in building camaraderie and
esprit de corps among classmates must not be underestimated.
Opportunities for professional development, further training,
and graduate education are available, and are endorsed by both
Clientelism. " Also see Wesson, p. 52, for further analysis of how
the military system "parallels" civilian political camarillas.
Cornelius and Craig in Almond and Powell, p. 467.
~




civilian and military leadership.
The \~egio Miiizar graduates and commissions 200-350
Army officers each year. The :adets earn degrees in
engineering and the physical sciences as well as political
science. Senior officers attend the Escueia Superior de Guerra
to continue their education and prepare themselves for staff
duty
.
While the Navy has played a relatively small part in
Mexican history, it retains its own service academy in
Veracruz :.nd is represented it -he federal level by the
Ministry of Marine/ established in 1939.
The Colegio del Aire prepares Air Force officers for
their future. The Mexican Air Force separated from the Army in
1944, while the Navy retains its own aviation corps. Mexico
was the first Latin American nation to recognize the
importance of air power, and 'developed an indigenous
capability in the first years of human flight. 3y 1920 the
Anna Aerea de las Fuerzas Constivucionales had produced 50
aircraft, far ahead of Mexico's southern neighbors.
Education and training have played an important role
in the prof essionalizat ion of Mexico's armed forces. Without
formal education the military could soon lose its appeal to
bright and ambitious young men as a means of social mobility
and professional experience. The training environment also
Equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy
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serves to build a competitive and elite team spirit which has
perpetuated the military's position within, but morally above,
the political system.
As in other latin American nations, the Mexican
military has generally been viewed as a means of advancement
by upper- lower and lower-middle class men. The armed forces
offer education and social advancement opportunities,
especially for officers, which might not otherwise have been
available within Mexico's traditionally centralized economy
and social structure.
C. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN MEXICAN SOCIETY
Mexican social structure is in many ways more hierarchical
than that of the United States, and tends to be more
respectful of authority. This may be due in part to the
centralized political power structure and strong social
influence of the Roman Catholic Church. While the military has
weathered times of sagging reputation, as it did following the
1968 Tlatelolco incident and during recent investigations of
The 1968 Tlatelolco incident proved to be a watershed for
the Mexican Army. Soldiers called in to break up student rioting in
Mexico City opened fire, killing "scores (perhaps hundreds) of
unarmed student demonstrators..." [George Philips. "Diaz Ordaz and
the Student Massacre at Tlatelolco." The Presidency in Mexican
Politics
. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.) p. 19.] The
massacre left a deep scar on the collective psyche of the military,
and has effectively dampened for nearly 25 years the level of
repression the military is willing to use in maintaining social
order. Following Tlatelolco, the military could have chosen to
respond with either continued repressive force or its current
repulsion to another such event. The fact that Mexico's army has
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possioie drug oracle involvement and other corruption, in the
long-term these incidents have been ittributed to the nsuse
f power by a few misguided individuals, and not an evil
inherent in the institution itself. The military remains
largely a respected profession in Mexico, much as it is in the
United States
.
Despite the perceived manipulation of the military in the
1983 elections by the PRI for political ends, the armed forces
continue to offer excellent opportunities in a well-respected
career field to Mexico's young men. In the late 1970s, the
military embarked on a modernization plan designed to enhance
its reputation at home and abroad. At the same time, the
profits of a booming Mexican oil industry were poured into
training and increasing levels of active duty manpower. Under
this program, the number of active duty men has more than
tripled in 2 5 years. A "comprehensive programme of re-
equipment" and expansion was announced to herald the
chosen a decreased role in politically motivated crowd control
situations is significant. It sterns at least in part from the
continued level of identification that Mexican military men
maintain with their civilian heritage. Since 1968, Mexico's armed
forces have been reluctant to forcefully engage civilian resistance
to the government, and are likely to remain so despite the
increasing potential for government pressure in the coming years.
See Roderic A. Camp. Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth
Cent urv Mex i c o . (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989.) pp. 24-25, and Meyer and Sherman, pp. 668-671.




modernization of the 1980s. This program was subsequently
shelved by the economic crisis Df 1382, leaving Mexico's
soldiers, sailors, ^^nd airmen still equipped with largely pre-
1955 vintage equipment.
In November of 1989 the modernization campaign was
formally re-engaged when National Defense Secretary General
Antonio Riviello Bazan made an announcement committing the
military leadership to matching the modernizing pace of
Mexican society within the military.-' He also, agreed with
President .Salinas's plans for modernization of the military,
saying "(t)o renounce modernization is to condemn Mexico to
poverty, ignorance, and instability." 3 ' The Navy Secretary was
also interviewed, and stated that,
the Navy is being modernized and renewed just like the
(Army and Air Force) . . "to consolidate the fulfillment of
our constitutional duties, guarantee the nation's
security, and protect the national sovereignty. '""
See footnote 68. Also see Wesson, p. 161, for figures
related to the Mexican military's growth objectives.
*°
"Defense Secretary Backs Military 'Modernization.'" XHTV
Television, Mexico City, 4 November 1989, as reported by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service in FBIS-LAT-89-220 , 16
November 19 89. p. 6.
31 Ibid
'- Quoting Mexican Naval Secretary Admiral Luis Carlos Ruano
Angulo in a press conference given 15 June 1991, as reported in
"Navy Chief on Modernization, Antidrug Operations." XHTV
Television, Mexico City, 15 June 1991, in FBIS-LAT-91-I20 , 21 June
1991. p. 2.
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The government: ' s support for rhe modernization of its armed
services serves both to at lease partially satisfy any
perceptions of neglect ~r non-support on che part of the
military, and to keep military officers occupied with the more
traditional trappings of a military career. Pineyro deals with
this issue, saying that while modernization has allowed the
Mexican military to develop esprit de corps and to
professionalize, it has not yet reached that dangerous and
dividing line beyond which soldiers and sailors see themselves
as removed from and superior to rivil society. Mexico's
military modernization thus has helped the nation in
maintaining autonomy from foreign powers as well as keeping
the armed forces focused on a military role.' 3
1. The Domestic Role
Since 1940, Mexico's military resources have
increasingly been directed against specific internal threats
to national security as defined by the civilian government.
This internal focus is reflected in the defensive posture of
the armed forces. The nation's Revolution deepened the resolve
of its leaders to maintain Mexico's commitment to
international self -determinism and non-intervention. The
military's response plans for addressing its major and most
volatile missions are covered by the three Planes de Defense
Nacional
,
or National Defense Plans. These task the armed
13 Pineyro in Varas
. pp. 127- 12
S
torces co cover contingencies related to threats of foreign
invasion, guerrilla insurgency, and natural disaster. " Goodman
and Johanna Mendeison maintain that rhe guerrilla threat of
the 1960s and 1970s helped rue military in its shift to "a
preoccupation with subversion and internal security.""
Several ancillary domestic threats also endanger a
continued professional role, while constituting the majority
of tasking for the modern Mexican military. Four of these
threats will be briefly discussed here. The loss of PRI
hegemony as a primary threat is not disputed - indeed, none of
the following dangers to continued civil rule is likely Co
cause a military repoliticizat ion in and of itself. In
conjunction with others, however, or by means of a "flash
point" concurrent with the election of a non-PRI president,
these factors could strongly influence Mexico's military to
assume an increased political role. These four issues have
been carefully chosen for cheir wide representation of Che
current and impending dangers to a subordmaCed and
professionalized Mexican military, and not because they form
an exhaustive list.
First is the counternarcotics effort, which requires
' Ibid, p. 124. Additional information on the missions of Che
Mexican military can be found on pp. 118-124.
Goodman and Mendeison. "The Threat of New Missions: Latin
American Militaries and the Drug War." In Goodman, Mendeison, and
Rial. p. 190.
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huge expenditures of military manpower. Eradication z i growers
ind interdict! n _. f traffickers is :onsidered :i major
objective of the Mexican armed forces, rmd is currently tasked
as the permanent mission of ver 25,000 soldiers. The danger
lies not only within the narcotics issue, but also "threatens
traditional concepts of military professionalism" " by
involving military personnel in domestic, covert, and
corrupt ion-laden activities. While the counternarcotics issue
has not yet assumed the "national political stature" 37 in
Mexico that it has in the United States, ail of the armed
services are currently actively involved in interdiction and
eradication, and no diminishing of that role is predicted. The
counternarcotics issue has the potential, if not strictly
controlled, to corrupt both military soldiers and their high-
ranking leaders. This could sever institutional loyalties and
divide portions of the armed forces against each other, a
dangerous and threatening turn of events for the continuance
:
" Ibid. p. 191.
Guadalupe Gonzalez. "The Drug Connection in U.S. -Mexican
Relations." The Drug Connection in U.S. -Mexican Relations .
Guadalupe Gonzalez and Marta Tienda leds) . (San Diego: Center for
U.S. -Mexican Studies, Univ. of Ca , 1989.) p. 5. this monograph is
part of a series edited by Rosario Green and Peter H. Smith, which
addresses five topics of concern to future bilateral relations. The
Drug Connection provides an excellent assessment of the different




of civil rule . ' :
A second auxiliary threat involves the immigration of
the Guatemalan refugees and insurgents who cross Mexico's
southern border, and the emigration of large numbers of able-
bodied workers to the United States in search of employment.
The former present an internal insurgency threat and employ
much of the army's manpower. The latter drain Mexico's labor
force and economy. The country has long acted as a mecca to
the displaced of Central America, much as the United States
has issued its siren's call to malcontented Mexicans. For its
own national security reasons, Mexico continues to be
concerned by the seemingly endless influx of Guatemalans
fleeing north across its border. Many are suspected of
carrying with them the seeds of communist revolution. The
Mexican Army has been tasked with closing the porous southern
border, and takes its anti-communist, anti-insurgent mission
most seriously.
To the north, Mexico is plagued with a labor drain to
the United States. Whole communities suffer "migrant
syndrome," in which rhe work force of entire townships is
significantly depleted. Mexico's armed forces are also
For further information on Mexico's counternarcot ics threat
and the involvement of its armed forces, see Andrew Reding and
Christopher Whalen. Fragile Stability: Reform and Repression in
Mexico under Carlos Salinas. 1989-1991
. (New York: Mexico Project,
World Policy Institute, 1991.) Also see Thomas A. Murphy's thesis
"Prospects for United States-Mexican Cooperation in the War on Drug
Trafficking." (Monterey, Ca : Naval Postgraduate School, 1990.)
concerned over the militarization of the 2000 mile common
border during the 1930s, when the :J . 3 . tripled the number of
agents and significantly increased :he regional military
presence
.
Urban overpopulation, with its threat of social unrest
and disease outbreaks of epidemic proportion poses a third
potential catalyst for a revitalized military presence in
Mexico and revised political role. Likewise, excessive
For more extensive stu :y f Mexico's border trouoies and the
threat they pose to continued stability, see Cunningham in Ronfeidt
(1984. i Also see Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey. "Mexican
Migration to the United States: A Critical Review." In LARR, Volume
27, Number 2, 1991, and Lorenzo Moreno, "The Linkage Between
Population and Economic Growth in Mexico: A New Policy Proposal?"
LARR, Volume 26, Number 3, 1991. The author also highly recommends
Wayne A. Cornelius, "Mexican Migration to the United States."
Mexican Migration to the United States: Origins. Consequences, and
Policy Potions. Wayne A. Cornelius and Jorge A. Bustamante (eds).
(San Diego: Center for U.S. -Mexican Studies, Univ. of Ca , 1989.)
This monograph covers the U.S. labor demand, Mexican labor supply,
the "social and economic consequences of transborder labor
migration," (p. 10) and provides an analysis of policy options for
both the United States and Mexico. In the same volume, Kitty
Calavita provides an insightful assessment of the 1980s move toward
a U.S. militarization of the border. See her ess^ty, "The
Immigration Policy Debate: Critical Analysis and Future Options."
Bustamante
' s essay, "Undocumented Immigration: Research Findings
and Policy Options" in Roett (1988) also gives a clear and focused
assessment of the national security implications of this issue.
The United Nations estimates the year 2000 population of
Mexico City at 27.87 million people. Reported in Hoffman, p. 771.
Currently, 14 million Mexico City residents are estimated to be
without clean water or adequate sewage, making the "ring of misery"
as the slums are called, a breeding ground for disease. For further
information on Mexico's urban overpopulation problem, see Moreno in
LARR, and Foley in LARR
. Foley describes at length the policies of
the Salinas administration and the President's plan for dealing
with the campesinos. It is these unlanded who are displaced from
their rural homes and seek a better life in the cities, at the rate
of over one million per year for Mexico City alone.
military involvement :r perceived government mis-handling of
an environmental crisis rcuid both increase Mexico's military
presence and substantially change its role.
These issues are representative of the maior, modern,
internal threats to Mexico's national security. It is clear
that since the subordination of Mexico's military to the
civilian government some 50 years ago, the domestic role of
the armed forces has increased. The fact that the military's
mission has been virtually contained within its own borders,
yet no threat to civil rule has re-emerged, is a tribute to
the professionalism of Mexico's military leadership and its
continuing commitment no the goals of the Revolution.
a. The Military and the Tecnlcos
In the past 20 years, the Mexican military
leadership has been forced to deal with a new breed of
commander-in-chief. Carlos Salinas is the fourth consecutive
president who has not previously held elective office. 11 He
follows Luis Echeverria, Jose Lopez Portillo, and Miguel de la
Madrid in a string of government administrators with advanced
technical skills and training. The cecnicos , with their "more
narrow focus,"'- have thus far been privileged to bypass much
Cornelius and Craig in Almond and Powell, p. 450.
Elizabeth G. Ferris. "Toward a Theory for the Comparative
Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy." Latin American Foreign
Policy: Globa l and Regional Dimensions . Elizabeth G. Ferris and
Jennie K. Lincoln ( eds ) . iBoulder: West view Press, 1981.) p. 252.
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. r ~he taint of corruption and fraud which permeates the
traditional political structure. They have been stereotyped as
lacking the basic political skills required to run Mexico's
federal government, and advancing primarily on the merit of
foreign-earned graduate degrees. Years of government service,
however, mean that these men have not been political novices
when elected. Rather, their previous service has typically
been spent in non-elected federal positions, often in
"financial and planning agencies, " ' 4 making them well-prepared
to deal with the economic issues so prevalent in Mexico today.
While there are definite advantages to being a
political "outsider" as president, there are commensurate
concerns, especially within the military:
(N)ever tolerant of instability or lack of discipline,
(the armed forces) must be convinced by the tecnicos that
"things won't get out of hand." One way to do this is to
keep the services modernized and properly educated in
order to respond to any threat.
The tecnico president faces greater challenges than
a politico in maintaining the pride and autonomy of Mexico's
military. He is an unknown entity and without experience in
See Cornelius and Craig, both in Almond and Powell, p. 450,
^nd in The Mexican Political System in Transition , p. 48, for
iurther discussion of these stereotypes against the cecnicos
.
' 4 Cornelius and Craig, p. 48.
Keiley. p. 56.
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dealing with military forces. He must guard against being
perceived :is unknowiedgeable or in Levoted no shielding the
armed forces from engagement in policies, and muse maintain
his authority in the established command structure, especially
his position as commander-in-chier
.
Since future Mexican presidents are iikeiy to be recruited
from the ranks of the Technocrats, there is iittle
prospect of a return co government by traditional
polit icos
.
The tecnicos will apparently continue as a fixture
in future Mexican administrations. The military acceptance and
support of each presidential aspirant will ultimately rest on
the reputation he enjoys within the armed forces and the
respect he demands from its leadership.
2 . The International Role
The modern Mexican military has no history of an
external mission. As a home-based and internally- focused
force, the impressive level of professionalism attained in the
years since the Revolution seems to be singularly cut of step
with the path chosen by a majority of Latin American
militaries. The Mexican forces have been content to retain a
traditional military focus, applying their men and arms to
internal objectives when tasked, but not seeking a role for
Cornelius and Craig in Almond and Powell, p. 451
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themselves in the political structure.
The strong and continuing ::ornmitment sf the Mexican
government -Aid its military to the ioais sf its Revolution
includes a moral imperative to denounce foreign
interventionism as ?. political tool. As was mentioned
previously, Mexico has strongly supported ideological
plurality in foreign governments when those governments have
been deemed legitimate by their peoples. Mexico is firmly
convinced of both the immorality of past U.S. encroachments on
its sovereign affairs, and of U.S. interventions in Central
American and Caribbean nations. This explains the lack of
Mexican armed involvement in the region, and is a confirmation
of the enduring strength of Mexican Revolutionary ideology.
This chapter has also discussed the more active role
of the Mexican military in areas which are traditionally non-
military in nature. Goodman and Mendelson see this shift in
mission as leading to a "new professionalism, " " which stresses
internal as opposed to external security issues. They argue
that the rising importance of fighting domestic narcotics
trafficking and guerrilla movements has led to "a
While this section of the essay is purposefully kept short,
the subject is an interesting one. For additional information
please see the author's essay as previously noted.
Goodman and Mendelson in Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial. p.
190.
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preoccupation with subversion and internal security"'
throughout Central and South America since the 1960s.
Still, the Mexican armed forces have survived for 7
years without an external role. Their government's politics
have precluded military involvement in the conflicts of the
region, -yet have maintained an active and professional
capability, unlike the Costa Rican example. (In Costa Rica a
national police force has been substituted for traditional
military forces with considerable domestic success.) The
importance of the military prof essionalizat ion so carefully
engendered and maintained by the Mexican civilian
establishment must not be sold short. Professionalism has been
the major component in retaining the specialist nature of
Mexico's domestically-oriented military, without allowing it
to degenerate into a militarized police force.
Ibid,
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IV. THE CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
Historically, political opposition parties have
"essentially performed a stabilizing function"" ' in Mexico.
They have served as an outlet for the disenchanted electorate,
and since 1976, allowed token representation at the local,
state, and even national levels. The most probable threat to
continued civilian rule in Mexico is a continued, gradual
subsumption of PRI power by growing opposition parties. The
question remains: how will the military react to this loss of
hegemony? The Mexican armed forces are extremely loyal to the
government party, and their true level of subordination will
be tested if a non-PRI president is elected.
The PRI did not intend to create the instrument of its own
demise through the necessity of incorporating increasing
proportional representation into government. Alternate parties
were supported "to give the PRI something to run against,
thereby strengthening the government's claim to popular
support and legitimate authority.""" This process proved
impossible to control. The PRI is "now confronted bv myriad
' Cornelius and Craig (1991.) p. 73
101 Ibid.
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challenges 10 its political hegemony and legitimacy, "' z
created by its own efforts ac co-opting political power and
maintaining its own legitimacy. Options for future PRI-PAN and
PAN-PRD coalitions are discussed by Miguel Angel Centeno. The
latter alliance, especially, is increasingly likely as pacts
are made no ensure replacement of PRI incumbents with
opposition candidates.-
Military relations with the PRI remain much as they have
for over 60 years,- 14 and will continue as long as the PRI
provides for the needs of the military without involving it
unduly in political matters. The PRI has thus kept the
military reputation untarnished and paid its soldiers,
sailors, and airmen relatively well. Loyalties run deep on
both sides, and an intense allegiance to the PRI presidency is
Miguel Angel Centeno. Mexico in the 1990s: Government and
Opposition Sneak Out
. (San Diego: Center for U.S. -Mexican Studies,
Univ. ofCa, 1991.) p. 1.
See Centeno
' s introduction. Also Carlos 3. Gil (ed). Hope
and Frustra tion: Interviews with Leaders of Mexico's Political
Opposition. ( Scholarly Resources , Wilmington, De; 1992.) pp. 71-76.
Also see
. "Mexicans Hope to Dislodge Ruling Party." The
Californian
.
6 November 1992. p. 10A, and "Fears of Fraud, Violence
Shroud Election in Mexico." The Californian . 9 November 1992. p.
5A. This article discusses the Fall 1992 coalition between the PAN
and PRD, which "joined forces to back businessman Jorge Cardenas"
for the governorship of Tamaulipas. Although the coalition
candidate was purportedly credited with having won ^0 percent of
the popular vote, the PRI candidate was declared the official
winner of the gubernatorial election.
Meyer in Reyna and Wienert . p. 10. Meyer cites Reyna '
s
essay on political control in modern Mexico entitled "Control
Politico, Estabilidad y Desarrollo en Mexico. " Cuadernos del C.E.S.
Numero 3, 1974.
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ingrained in military leaders. "The military rends to see
itself as morally superior _ : the country's civilian
leaders"' ' especially the tecnicos, and will continue to carry
out its mission of protecting and defending the government in
the person of the president. For example, it is not unusual
for a defense secretary or other high-ranking military leader
to "reiterate the loyalty of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to
(the) President'" ' as commander-in-chief, rather than to the
Constitution or to the Republic.
The importance of this distinction between fealty to the
Presidency and to the party requires that careful
consideration be given to the possibility that if the PRI
presidency were to be replaced by an opposition president-
elect, the Mexican military could conceivably transfer its
institutional loyalties from the Constitution and the
government as an institution to the persona of the PRI
presidential candidate and the PRI party leadership. Likewise,
the leadership of the armed forces could transfer their
loyalties to the new opposition president. Much of how the
military reacts to this loss of PRI hegemony will be shaped by
the PRI response to its declining power. Four of the options
available to the PRI and the projected military reactions will
be discussed in Chapter V.
Cornelius and Craig in Almond and Powell, p. 467
106 FBIS-LAT-89-220. p. 6.
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Fears exist among proponents . i a multi-party democracy
that before this point tan be reached, the military will
unilaterally decide ts expand its role in elections to
preclude opposition parties from gaining significant levels of
public support, and potentially exert substantial influence on
the results. It is also possible such an increased military
role could be tasked by the PRI in an effort to maintain
political dominance. To :iueil public concerns about the
military iefense of PRI hegemony prior to the 1991
gubernatorial elections, Mexican Defense Minister Antonio
Riviello Bazan announced that the Army and Air Force would not
intervene in the elections, that the presence of soldiers was
only a precautionary measure to preserve order during the
polling and to collect ballots.
-
Despite growing voter support and increasing
representation at the local, state, and even national levels,
a non-PRI president will present a virtually unknown entity,
both personally and corporateiy. The level of military support
received will largely depend on the personality and politics
of the opposition president, as well as the willingness of the
PRI incumbent to transfer power out of PRI hands. The
president-elect's sphere of influence will be significantly
As announced by Mexican Defense Secretary General Antonio
Riviello Bazan and reported in "Ejercico y Fuerza Aerea, solo Para
cuidar el Orden Durance los Comicios . " Excelsior . 7 July 1991, p.
1A. Carried by the U.S. Government's Info South Database.
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narrowed if not approved by the military.
When future public opinion strongly supports a non -PR
I
(either PAN or leftist coalition) candidate for President of
Mexico, the armed forces and civil society may become
polarized: The military :ould continue to rely on the
institutionalized PRI presidency and Senate for its support.
Central to the issue of military support will be the question
as to which party's candidate succeeds the PRI presidential
incumbent. The armed forces in Mexico, as in most countries,
are a largely conservative institution, and are far more
likely to accept a PAN president than a leftist one. The
military leadership will not easily accept the virtually
inevitable transition of power to any other political party,
however, despite the political affiliation of the candidate.
This scenario, which will almost surely occur within the next
20 years, may well serve to pit the military against civil
society if the electorate backs a PRD (or like coalition)
candidate perceived as unresponsive to the needs and desires
of the military. This could leading to increased military
repression and deprof essionalizat ion through direct military
interference in civil politics.
While the Mexican presidency has been largely
depersonalized in favor of the larger party institution, PRI
power remains centralized in the office of the presidency, and
support within the military for that office remains
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unilaterally tied to the PRI . The strength of the presidential
office, however, is clearly diminishing. Smith warns, "(i)t
seems unlikely.
. . chat the office can regain its traditional
omnipotence and quasi-magical aura. " Thus the PRI presidency
is creating its own slippery .slope, which may eventually
result in the loss of the presidency. The 1988 and 1991
elections saw unprecedented levels of electoral fraud
precipitated by the government and often enforced by armed
servicemen. While military forces were positioned at the polls
ostensibly to maintain order, their presence may have been
felt as a physical threat in some politically contentious
areas. It is unknown how long this trend of utilizing the
military to enforce PRI will can continue without widespread
public rebellion, just as is unknown how far the military will
go to maintain PRI hegemony in the Presidential Palace.
Zinser has written, "The nature of civil-military
relations. .
. hinges on the military's remaining trustful of
and loyal to the civil authorities it recognizes. . . "* ' The key
here lies in recognition: if the armed forces are willing to
further increase repression and electoral fraud, either at the
incumbent president's behest or on their own initiative, they
will continue to separate themselves from service to the state
and the public in favor of service to the party. If, however,
Smith in Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith, p. 413
Zinser in Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial. p. 229.
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the military leadership feels threatened, its perceptions of
a decreased social position or political status could lead the
military to attempt a usurpation of that power.
A. THE POTENTIAL FOR INTERVENTION
The loyalty and subordination of the Mexican military to
its civil government is well-documented. What has not been
explored are the factors which could cause this relationship
to decay. The very prof essionalizat ion Mexico's military
leadership has so strongly pursued over the past 50 years
could be the vehicle of a newly politicized role. Pineyro
notes that
(m) ilitary education and productive capacity are
increasing the military's potential for autonomy: the
training of military professionals, such as doctors,
dentists, engineers, managers, and so forth, plus their
capacity to supply basic goods, such as food, suggest that
the armed forces may one day be able to function without
input from civil society. 11 "
Increased military autonomy can thus be viewed as a factor of
professionalism in this case. Pineyro ' s concern is that
military autonomy from civil society could cause the armed
forces to deny civil control. If Mexico's armed services were
to usurp political power, Pineyro says that they have the
tools and skills, largely because of the advanced education
110 Pineyro in Varas
. p. 124
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ana other vehicles of rrciessionai::ac:cn, to lake en such
casks rmd to withdraw from :ivii society and rencroi. The
relationship between Mexico's military and civilian government
elites is, h wever, no more static than any other
relationship. rhus the factors which affect the rurrent
stability ire in constant motion, and the balance between
political subordination and remilitarization is mncinuaily
changing
.
While the modern Mexican armed forces currently pose
little more ~r i threat tc rhe Salinas administration than
the military of the United States poses domestically, lesser
circumstances would be required to move the Mexican forces to
regain an active political role, and perhaps even to take the
Presidency by force. As Kelley noted, "Any instability or lack
of competence shown by the ruling elite could be met with
military intervention.""' While the likelihood of this appears
minimal today, the loss of PRI hegemony could conceivably
bring the services to a "flash point." The military would
repoliticize if its leaders felt that national stability or
its own political position was seriously threatened.
The history of the post-Revolutionary government in Mexico
has been one of flexibility and co-optation. Having survived
for over \ '/ears as the true incarnation of the Revolution,
the PRI corporate ideology and, to some extent, mythology,
til rKelley
. p . 57
.
will be hard-pressed for acceptance in a non-PRI president.
Sanderson refers to the strength of the PRI as residing in its
"political unpredictability snci amazing party resiliency in
the face of crisis. ""'" The needs of the military may not
continue to be met by a -weakening PRI government, however,
even with such stores of resiliency and institutional loyalty
as the PRI has engendered in the armed forces.
The potential for a military repoiiticizat ion and its
likely impact on the prof essionalizat ion of the Mexican armed
forces will be examined in the next section of tnis thesis
through the framework provided by Davies ' J-Curve and his
theory of relative deprivation.
B. THE J-CURVE AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
Increasingly unfulfilled expectations beget revolution.
This is the basic premise behind James Davies' model, _!3 and
one which lends itself to interpretation and application to
the PRI-military relationship in Mexico. A modernized,
educated military leadership suddenly perceiving itself as
abandoned by its political patron and position through the
election of a non-PRI president could view itself as being in
this predicament. The PRI has worked to empower its military
Steven Sanderson. "Presidential Succession and Political
Rationality in Mexico." World Politics , Volume XXXV. (Princeton
Univ. Press, Lawrenceville, N.J; 1983.) p. 318.
James C. Davies. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." ( American
Sociological Rpvipw. Volume 6, Number 1, February 1962.)
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forces, but could find such efforts backfiring as the military
perceives itself as deprived of its legitimate needs.
Davies maintains that a simultaneous and relatively equal
rise in levels of expectation and satisfaction maintain social
stability. When that relative level of gratification can no
longer be maintained by the institution, the individual or
group feels disillusioned and deprived. Applying this model,
it is the PRI government which is responsible for ensuring
acceptable levels of satisfaction are maintained for Mexico's
military. The military's levels of satisfaction then must fail
behind the still increasing level of expectations, and the
group become dissatisfied with its lot, before revolution is
born. With current levels of gratification, the military is
content and continues to support the government. The gap
between levels of expectation and their realization may,
however, widen precipitously, triggered by the loss of PRI
hegemony. The armed forces might then withdraw their support
and turn against the PRI government or its imminent successor.
According to Davies, the source of this relative
deprivation can either originate at basic levels (food,
clothing, shelter) or at higher ones, involving such factors
as wage increases and job benefits. The level at which the
deprivation takes place is inconsequential, as it is the
increasing rift between expectations and attainment which
causes the feelings of deprivation. Victims "fear not just
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chat things will no longer continue to get better, but - even
more :ruciaily - that round will be lost that they have
already gained
.
Within the Mexican military, perceptions of relative
deprivation could potentially arise as domestic threats
consume the energies ^^nd resources the military considers its
own. These may become a primary threat as the PRI loses its
preeminent political position, and leaders of the armed forces
must seek out cheir new role in a changing government . The
move to increase military involvement in domestic issues could
also pose a serious threat to a professionalized military, as
was postulated by Zinser.
In addition, while not a factor for political mobilization
in and of itself, the state of the Mexican economy could be a
decisive element in this analysis. The importance of Mexico's
economy to the country's political stability is growing as the
country modernizes and industrializes, and the link between
economy and polity will continue to strengthen. Another
recession such as the country experienced in the 1930s could
well push Mexico's PRI government over the brink of political
as well as economic bankruptcy. While the United States would
use all possible means to preclude such a recurrence, another
32
:4 Ibid.
Zinser in Goodman, Mendelson and Rial, especially pp. 229
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worldwide economic depression such as was experienced in 1929
could effectively prevent "he United States from activating
its resources against such a remilitarization. An economic
collapse 3iione would not irive Mexico's armed services to
resume their former political role. A severe economic decline,
however, especially when figured jointly with the loss of FRI
hegemony and one or more of the four ancillary factors
mentioned previously, could evoke sufficient feelings of
deprivation among the ranks of Mexico's military leadership to
foment a repoliticization
.
According to Davies ' model, increased incidents of
military aggression and repression would occur as precursors
of military repoliticization in response to rising
frustrations within the armed forces. This assumes the move to
repoliticize is internal to the military itself. In modern
Mexico, however, such a move would probably not originate
within the military, but would be precipitated
as associates of civilian sectors that are strong and
persuasive enough to convince certain members of the
military of the adequacy and timeliness of their
assumption of government functions. :: "
Ibid. pp. 219-220. linser notes that Ronfeldt agrees with
his assessment of the increased potential for Mexican military
repoliticization if it originates outside of the military, in the
civilian elite sector. This position is also taken by Cunningham in
Ronfeldt (1984 . ) p. 172
.
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This adds a factor to the equation proposed by Davies by
including the potential for ei "bird party. Thus the
theoretical door is opened for : ; group such as disillusioned
and exasperated PRI elites to act as the catalyst for military
repoliticization in Em effort to maintain failing PRI
hegemony. While deprofessionalizing its role in society and,
in the long run, demeaning the role it has worked for so long
to protect and defend, this scenario of a military empowerment
in Mexico at the suggestion of civilian elites is more
plausible than is a striot interpretation of Davies' theory.
Still, his direct application of relative deprivation to
military deprof essionaiizat ion and repoliticization provides
a useful framework for examining the potential range of
military responses to a loss of PRI hegemony, which is the
subject of the next chanter.
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V. FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PRI -MILITARY RELATIONS
The four-scenario model developed by Cornelius and Craig -1 "
provides an excellent approach for examining the future
options for Mexico's civil-military relations. Although the
authors ' original focus was :>n the government ' s internal
machinations rather than on the military's reaction to the
"breakdown of the one-party hegemonic political system in
Mexico,
" their four options can be readily applied to this
assessment of continued military subordination. The scenarios
range from political closure as the most likely alternative to
bring about a military intervention, to irnmobilism, to the
modernization of the current authoritarian government
structure, and finally to limited power sharing at the far,
low end of the military interventionist spectrum. The next
portion of this thesis will apply these four scenarios to the
military's political position as PRI power diminishes, analyze
the circumstances which would bring each to bear, and assess
their consequences.
117 Cornelius and Craig, pp. 115-121
118 Ibid. p. 115
A. POLITICAL CLOSURE
Che first and most akeiy scenario for ~i military
repoiit icization involves "he political closure of Mexico.
This scenario is presented second in the original continuum
provided by Cornelius and Craig, atter immobiiism. When
applied to the future political role of the armed forces,
however, its factors clearly carry the highest potential for
military repoiit icization . In their definition of political
closure, Cornelius and Craig focus on internal PRI pressures
fcr political retrenchment and abandonment of democratic
reforms. They suggest PRI elite pressures upon the president
would threaten a dissolution of PRI support and cohesion for
the presidency if reforms were pursued. Their model also
hinges political closure on the failure of the economic model
emplaced by President Salinas and his tecnico predecessors.
The first factor in this scenario, mounting international
pressure, would seek to force the faltering PRI government
into accepting a new role as one among many political parties,
resulting in a PRI retrenchment. The original model indicates
such political retrenchment would require an increase in
authoritarianism and enforced social repression, resulting in
international pressure to moderate the government's harsh
stance. This could serve to severely set Mexico back in the
economic realm, which would not be tolerated by the military.
Political closure could thus also equal economic closure, a
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scenario which could not augur well for the nation. Therefore
this, like immobilism, is m mlikely alternative for the ?RI
government. Only the most reactionary party political leaders
would prove willing to isolate their country in the face of
modern economic expansion.
A second factor of political closure is the implementation
of the North American ?ree Trade Agreement, which should
virtually cut the option of political closure from the list of
available policy options. When the accord is ratified makes
little difference, as it will surely be an early priority of
the Clinton Administration. The increased international
focus and potential economic gains which are likely to
accompany execution of the accord, and the accompanying loss
of sovereignty inherent in any international trade agreement
should serve to keep both Mexico's civilian and military
leadership from allowing such an impasse to be reached.
If, however, political closure is reached before the
accord can be fully implemented, the possibility of economic
collapse also enters the picture. The possibility of Mexico
suffering any semblance of all-encompassing economic collapse
grows weaker and less likely as the inevitable implementation
of NAFTA becomes reality. Thus an actual enactment of events
justifying military usurpation of government control also
"Clinton tells Mexico's Salinas he Backs Trade
Pact." The Californian . 6 November 1992. p. 7C.
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become increasingly implausible.
General no this scenario is r.he third factor of political
closure, the severe deterioration f Mexico's economy stemming
trom the railure of economic policies enacted by the cecnico
PRI administration. In response, the first step toward
political closure would be the PRI presidenc ' s abandonment of
political reform. This would initially serve to rally some
increased measure of support for the embattled president among
a threatened elite. It would also, however, create an
immediate backlash among ail elements of the political
opposition, necessitating the imposition of further
authoritarian measures. In this scenario,
(s)ince the PRI seems to have lost the capacity to
incorporate such movements, there may be a strong
temptation to simply repress (political opposition) rather
than try to build strategic alliances with them. L:o
At the beginning of this phasing into political closure,
the loyalty and support of the military would be crucial:
without the backing of the armed forces, the president could
prove unable to project a sufficiently powerful presence to
maintain his position. Edward Williams and Freeman Wright note
that " (d)uring economic bad times the military tends co assume
power to save the nation from what it regards to be the
Cornelius and Craig, p. 11!
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ineptitude of civilian leaders."'"" Therefore the president
must continue to be viewed by the leadership of the armed
forces as both capable and decisive if military support is not
to come into question. With political and military elite
backing, however, the president :ould rally public support,
both to increase his own legitimacy and to portray an image of
strength.
The fourth and final factor of political closure, economic
collapse, becomes imminent as the PRI president is forced to
resort to increasingly authoritarian means to retain his
authority and position. Political elite backing fades as the
increasingly besieged president relies on fewer advisors and
less compromise. This remoteness of the head of the PRI from
both the party and his constituency would distance the
president from all but the closest followers.
As the president recedes from traditional PRI tactics,
toward inflexibility, the PRI cabinet and Secretaries of the
Army and Navy could be coerced into defending the president's
position on the grounds of economic and political stability.
In this scenario, the increasingly authoritarian measures
would most likely be touted publicly as temporary and
:21 Williams and Wright, p. 199. The authors list economic
reasons as the primary "internal condition" facilitating
repoliticization of Latin American militaries, above other social
and political pressures. Although Williams and Wright are referring
to Latin American militaries in general and not to Mexico's unique
case, their theory is equally plausible when examining the
potential catalysts of a Mexican repoliticization.
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necessary, albeit unfortunate. The military's position, "hen,
in the scenario .1 r. Dlicicai :iosure is not necessarily one of
action, our iefinitely one of \~ lease verbal support for the
president:, it is unlikely, however, that even a strong and
previously popular president would assume the continued
backing of the military if he were to attempt to repeatedly
utilize the armed forced to repress political dissent.
The potential for a repoiit icizat ion of Mexico's armed
forces is most likely to occur in the scenario of political
closure. While this is the least likely of the four scenarios
to actually occur, it carries the highest potential for a
military repoiit icization . Political closure is comprised of
four factors. First, A weakened and politically threatened PRI
could begin to retrench as international pressure to implement
democratic reforms mounts to intolerable levels. The second
factor involves the tenets of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the PRI fear of potential economic and political
losses. Third, the severe deterioration of Mexico's economy
could force the PRI to look to its loyal right arm, the
military, to maintain its seat in power. The military would
probably not usurp the reins of power for its own ends in this
scenario, even as the fourth factor, economic collapse, became
imminent. It could, however, do so at the behest of
disgruntled PRI elites fearing the impending loss of political
hegemony. As the strong arm of the PRI, the armed forces would
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Immobiiism is the second scenario in this model. It was
the first in the original model built by Cornelius and Craig.
Immobiiism represents a lesser threat of military
repolit icizat ion than does political closure, and is somewhat
more likely to occur.
Cornelius and Craig define immobiiism as the inability of
Mexico's PRI elite to "adapt constructively to the country's
new political environment. """ They posit that stagnation may
result as the PRI fails to respond with sufficient speed and
strength to popular calls for democratic reforms. Webster
provides the basis for this term, defining immobiiism as
(a) governmental policy characterized by compromise and
moderation often to the point of ignoring basic issues and
stagnation of progressive trends. ~
This formal definition of immobiiism is largely unknown, but
is in keeping with the definition provided by Cornelius and
Craig. Application of this term to their scenario for
political transition is appropriate. Implying an eventual
: - 2 Cornelius and Craig (1991.) p. 115.
123 Webster's Third International Dictionary . (Springfield,
Mass: Merriam-Webster Publishers, 1986.)
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inability to move or function effectively, the term is also
readily applied to examination of the relationship between
military and PRI leadership as the party is overtaken by
political opposition.
Several distinct factors of immobilism deserve individual
consideration. In the first notable component of this
scenario, military and civil leadership arrive at a political
impasse as PRI hegemony falters, a juncture neither is capable
of broaching successful!:/. PRI leadership would then prove
increasingly unable to govern due to a lack of legitimacy and
inability to adapt to the pluralistic political environment
forced upon it. Thus Mexico's political elites would
effectively freeze the wheels of their own government,
rendering ineffectual any and all attempts by PRI officials to
gain consensus or promote action.
Should this government freeze occur, the leadership of the
armed forces may see itself as (1) capable of adapting where
the civil government is not, (2) more in touch with the
constituency, and (3) more capable of ruling effectively than
the increasingly illegitimate PRI. Several key characteristics
of Mexico's modern military might assist a remilitarization in
this case: most importantly, the "increasing military
sophistication" 1 - 4 resulting from wide-spread access to
graduate-level education for large numbers of military
• 4 Cunningham in Ronfeldt (1984.) p. 172
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officers, which has resulted in an educaced and politically
astute ally for the PRI . Again, however, it is unlikely that
the armed forces, or independent groups of officers, would
attempt to usurp government: power for their own ends. It is
far more probable that senior officers could be persuaded by
disillusioned PRI officials to seize the Federal District in
the name of the PRI. This attempt would be made to return
legitimacy to the one-party system and broach Mexico's
political immobiiism.
A second factor ot immobiiism is the inherent ultra-
flexibility which could keep PRI party elites from coalescing
on the issues of democratization, thus dooming their position
in the pluralistic government of the future. Were the PRI
leaders able to maintain some semblance of cohesion in this
scenario, they might be able to lead the party in continuing
to provide political representation for large sectors of
Mexican society. Such interest consolidation is unlikely,
however, and immobiiism may effectively deny the party the
benefit of democratic reform. After-the-fact attempts at
political reform would have virtually no chance of success.
As the civilian PRI government becomes increasingly bound
by pressures to compromise, the leadership of the armed forces
may perceive the party as abandoning the objectives of the
Revolution in favor of self-preservation. In response, the
military is more likely to take upon itself the responsibility
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for carrying on chose ideals. This rould cake che form of
increased military rcutcnomy and f. greater political role by
senior military personnel.
A third factor of immobilisrn is chat ic could so paralyze
the party by the time slices attempt reform, chat even a
strong political leader would be unable Co revitalize and
motivate party support . The dirmnishment of the president's
role is inherent in this scenario, making the threat posed to
the PRI government by political opposition less than the level
achieved within the PRI itself. In such a situation the party
elites would see no alternative but to look to new sources for
leadership, perhaps attempting to utilize the military in
enforcing their will.
The demise of the office of the PRI president as central
leader of the country would throw the armed forces into a
quandary. In the second factor of imrnobilism, the military may
feel the ideals of the Revolution are being abandoned by the
PRI government. In the third, it could be the military itself
which feels abandoned by its patron, the president of Mexico.
This could prove devastating to the services so painstakingly
subordinated over a number of decades to the civil government.
A loss of leadership in an authoritarian system such as
Mexico's could cause the military-' as well as the civilian
administration to search for new sources of leadership,
despite the divisive results for both groups.
b7
A fourth factor of immobilism is the inevitable split
which would emerge from the actions of both the reactionaries
within the party elite who wish to return to a PRI government
at all costs, and the revolutionaries, both internal and
external to the party, who wish to impose democratic reforms.
This could cause party elites to split along poiicico-vecnico
or conservative-liberal lines, but the resulting factionalism
would almost certainly prove fatal to the PRI as a co-opting
influence in Mexican society and hasten its political
destruction. Cornelius and Craig postulate that in the case
of immoDiiism, the PRI would either return to its corporatist
heritage or
the party will be irrevocably split, with the old-style
corporatists and the modernizing technocrats going their
own separate ways, taking whatever supporters they can
muster .
^
The result would be a virtual deadlock, with neither leftist
nor rightist opposition parties able to break the stalemate.
Indeed, the split in the PRI could serve to further divide and
conquer the political opposition, rendering it less effective
than before the PRI breakdown. As PRI leaders then settle into
one of two camps, probably divided along reactionary politico
or reform-minded tecnico lines, the corporatist legacy of the
125 Cornelius and Craig, p. 115
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?RI might well be shattered in favor of two (or more)
polarized factions competing for popular support. Each sector
of the failing PRI part:/ would then be forced to muster its
own popular support, but the transition from PRI hegemony to
multi-party plurality would have to be completed without the
former's stabilizing influence.
Caught in the middle of this split between conservatives
and liberals, or politicos and tecnicos, the military might
well be seen by all PRI factions as a prize to be won. While
the generals and admirals of the military would not relish
such a position, each contender for political power would
realize the significance of military backing, both from a
security perspective and from the possibility of utilizing any
residual legitimacy surrounding the military to increase its
own prominence and prestige.
The fifth and final factor of immobilism is "intra-elite
conflict"'" and the intra-party rivalries which would result
in an ineffective "lame duck" PRI president, who can only wait
for his successor's inauguration while watching his own
party's demise. This final factor could firmly freeze the
wheels of government and might provide a catalyst, effectively
propelling the military to seize the reins of political power.
Cornelius and Craig maintain that "(e)ven though the PRI
will continue to deteriorate, no opposition party will have
126 Ibid.
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the capacity to replace it in power, at least at the national
level."-- This may not be altogether true. As was discussed
previously, the PAN and PRD recently combined political forces
in Tamaulipas by supporting a single gubernatorial candidate
in an attempt to overthrow the PRI candidate."-' Similar
coalitions will probably be formed in other states as che PRI
becomes increasingly vulnerable to electoral defeat. Assuming
that for the 1990s, at least, Cornelius and Craig will
continue to be correct in their assessment that opposition
parties will be unable to defeat the PRI at the national
level, the military- will, for the present, remain the only
institution capable of preempting PRI power and maintaining
social order. The corporatist heritage of the Mexican armed
forces makes its military leaders natural successors to
political power in an immobilism scenario.
Immobilism would effectively stall the political efforts
of both the PRI and opposition parties, ensuring little could
be accomplished without a catalyst . This was postulated in the
preceding chapter through Davies ' theory of relative
deprivation with the addition of linser's requirement for a
catalyst. As unlikely as the entire scenario of immobilism
127 Ibid. p. 117.
. "Mexicans Hope to Dislodge Ruling Party." The
Californian . 6 November 1992. p. 10A. Also see . "Mexico
Opposition Plans Protest of Election." The New York Times . 10
November 1992, p. A6
.
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seems, ri military repoiiticizacion would be the most effective
rataiyst to break immobilism's political deadlock.
As the effects of these five factors of immobilism begin
to accumulate, the leadership of the armed forces could expect
to find their PRI benefactor consumed with self-preservation
and increasingly unconcerned with the welfare of its clients.
The military would thus be increasingly willing to seize
political power, at least temporarily. Let us summarize this
scenario's distinct implications for military intervention.
First, under immobilism the leadership of the armed forces is
likely to see itself as more capable of ruling and more
legitimate than the deadlocked PRI. Second, this same
leadership would see the ideals of the Revolution abandoned in
favor of self -perpetuation of the party supposedly committed
to preserving the union of the Republic. Third, the military
could view its role as abandoned by its long-time PRI patrons,
as they battle each other in the political infighting
consuming the Federal District. Fourth, factional squabbling
for military support could further confuse a military
dedicated to its own depolit lcization . And lastly, a faltering
an ineffectual lame-duck president might conceivably act as
the final straw forcing a repolit icizat ion of Mexico's armed
forces at the behest of disillusioned civilian elites. Thus,
it is not unrealistic to assume the military might, of its own




Its intentions in so doing, however, would not lie in
perpetuation of its own political power, out in an attempt to
reestablish the power base dz the inclusionary une-parcy
government system, based on Revolutionary ideals.
The scenario of immooilism :annot be overlooked when
reviewing the possibilities for Mexico's political forecast,
but the actual probability of such an occurrence is and shall
remain small. The political acuity of both Mexico's PRI and
its military must be taken into account: it seems unlikely
that such an impasse could be attained without drawing some
preemptive response from the government, military, or
political opposition.
C. MODERNIZATION OF AUTHORITARIANISM
In their model, Cornelius and Craig utilize this third
scenario to depict a re-energized PRI, capable of fending off
indefinitely any and all potential adversaries from either the
political right or left. This is the most likely PRI response
to an impending loss of hegemony, but bears a significantly
decreased potential for a repolit icizat ion of the armed
forces. A renewed authoritarianism could be applied by the PRI
in an attempt to maintain both political power and social
stability. Depending largely on Pronasol and other co-opting
programs aimed at increasing the base of PRI support, the




It is unreasonable, however, to chink that the growing
trend, towards political plurality could be permanently stepped
through such simple means. This would temporarily end the
divisive electoral fraud which has increased with the strength
of political opposition. It might even encourage greater
autonomy v/ithin the confines of those parameters acceptable to
the PRI
.
The amount of incorporation, flexibility, and
compromise which would be required, however, make the long-
term success of a modernized authoritarian system
questionable. Still, this option provides little potential for
a repolit icized military. The needs of the armed forces would
continue to be provided by the governing PRI elite, and the
military's power and social position remain assured.
The first factor of this scenario involves a reversion to
populism in the face of increased political pluralism at the
local and state levels. This would include an increase in
personalismo and a rising reliance by the PRI on the
charismatic leadership of the president. It would also give
rise to a growing authoritarianism at the national level.
This scenario would not be difficult for the leadership of
Mexico's armed forces to accept, as long as severe levels of
repression were not required in order to engage this renewed
authoritarianism. Assuming that the political powers behind
the PRI implement this scenario as a pre-emptive rather than
a reactionary measure, the political cost incurred by the
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military would be minimal. The armed forces currently proclaim
their allegiance to the president as well as to the Republic:
che transition to an increased authoritarianism would
therefore not require much political capital. The military
would, however, be caught between patron and patriotism if the
PRI hierarchy were to wait until a non-PRI president is
elected, or appears about to be elected, before implementing
the restrictions inherent in a modernized authoritarian
system. It is, however, unlikely that the PRI would wait until
such time as its hegemony has been lost (or that loss is
imminent) before instituting a revitalized authoritarian
model, centered around a highly personalistic presidency.
The second factor of modernized authoritarianism would be
the continuance of limited democracy at the state and local
levels, as far as this is condoned by the PRI national
leadership. This would serve to incorporate potentially
dangerous elements of the political opposition into the
government system. It would also allow the PRI to control the
level of that representation and the measure of its
effectiveness at meeting the needs of non-PRI supporters for
an indefinite period of time. With such a system, the PRI
could repress the strength of the competition presented at the
national level, but still permit a legal and potentially
viable political rivalry with the PRI. It could do so at a
level far lower than that proposed in the fourth scenario,
limited power sharing, but with far more efficacy than the
options proposed in scenarios one or two. Modernized
authoritarianism would also allow the PRI to retain its
political adversaries in a weakened state.
In this scenario, the PRI would not be likely to maintain
so strong a position as in either political closure or
immobilism, but would maintain sufficient political power only
to preserve a divided and unfocused opponent . The PRI
president and Cabinet could thus dole out political favors at
will, while sharing little of the responsibility for
constituent representation or decision-making authority.
This should provide an opportunity for the Mexican armed
forces to retain their current constabulary role and extra-
governmental role in support of the PRI government, while
remaining loyal to their nation's constitution. Having sworn
loyalty to both the president and the Republic, the leadership
of the armed forces could rest assured it was carrying out its
patriotic duty in supporting a reinforced PRI presidency,
having kept its covenant with the two equally well. The
prospect of a PRI-controlled political opposition would not
degrade the fealty of the military unless the party, needing
a speedy enforcement of its renewed authoritarianism as a
reactionary measure, decided to use the armed forces as its
enforcer. At that point, the military would be forced to
choose between its loyalty to the party and its bond to the
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people. It is doubtful the PRI would place the leadership of
the armed forces in such a precarious position and risk losing
its support. Were the situation that desperate ror the PRI,
the party would retrench or split as was seen in the first
scenarios, resulting in political closure or immobilism. Thus,
as a pre-emptive measure, the military can probably be counted
on to support the government if the PRI chooses to shift to a
more authoritarian mode. This would return PRI politics to the
early post-Revolutionary times when political opposition was
controlled by the PRI and its leaders envisioned little
potential for political puissance.
The third factor of a modernized authoritarian PRI
government would be the increased reliance on a "new set of
organizations and alliances."'-' A prime example of a modern
attempt to expand such incorporation efforts is the Pronasol
,
or Solidarity, movement which uses government- funded self-help
programs to galvanize (largely rural) communities into
supporting the PRI. While much good has resulted from Pronasol
initiatives with the building of schools and medical clinics,
it is evident that the program is being used for political
ends, to revive PRI support in areas which have experienced
high voter support for opposition parties. Thus, at least for
the present and near future, the PRI fulfills both its
corporatist goal of inclusionary government and galvanizes its
129 Cornelius and Craig, p. 118
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own position in power. "By reinstating the PRI ' s roie as a
welfare machine, Pronasol lias enabled the PRI to regain its
role as the centerpiece of the party system. """ Such
government programs are designed to increase the
attractiveness of the PRI to large sectors of the Mexican
population, and can be expected to increase dramatically in
the coming years, both in terms of government expenditures and
political influence.
Cornelius and Craig contend that the political sacrifices
required to enforce "a harsh, authoritarian closure"
"
: would
be virtually prohibitive. It can therefore be assumed that a
re-energized PRI would utilize the political gain from such
organizations as Pronasol to revitalize its political
legitimacy, increasing its palatability to the general public.
By coopting greater segments of the disaffected civilian
sector, the PRI could effectively ensure its hold on the
presidency, while having to give up little domestically, at
least, in the short term.
The Mexican armed forces are most likely to continue
supporting their government ' s increased investment in such
programs as Pronasol. Because the military performs an
Denise Dresser. "Bringing the Poor Back In: Poverty
Alleviation and Regime Legitimacy in Mexico." (Princeton Univ. and
Inscituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; September 1992.
Unpublished, p. 2.
131 Cornelius and Craig, p. 118.
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internal, constabulary role in Mexico, its leaders are highly
aware of those factors which affect the three sections of its
national defense plan. The military sees the beneficial
effects of programs designed to maintain social order as
helpful in its second mission, quelling internal political
movements which are deemed a threat to the state.
Specifically, the armed forces will support those programs
which are capable of pre-empting military mobilization to
combat civil disturbances.
The fourth and final factor of this scenario is the easing
of political restrictions. Unlike the scenario of political
closure, under modernized authoritarianism the PRI government
would not be besieged by a failed economy and would be likely
to remain willing and able to participate in the global
economy. 132 Under intense international scrutiny, the PRI
president and national leaders would doubtless seek to allay
the fears of their allies with certain measures such as a
deregulation of the media or giving increased attention to
alleged human rights violations. A revitalized authoritarian
PRI government would arouse world interest, a side effect not
desired by the PRI. Not wishing to call attention to itself in
Reding and Whalen would place the current Mexican
government at the modernized authoritarian level, but repeatedly
express concern in their paper that the United States is tacitly
supporting an administration, and indeed a corrupt government
system, which is both repressive to its citizens and will be
detrimental to the Republic in the long-run.
its retreat from the democratic reforms so recently praised by
the international community, the PRI would continue to keep
its armed forces cut of the spotlight. A heightened political
profile for the military would not serve the purposes of
either the PRI or the armed forces as they work together to
regain and solidify political hegemony for the party.
Consequently, the international expectations of an increased
political role for Mexico's military would go unrealized. The
leaders of the services can be expected to forego political
fame in order to renew their relationship with the PRI as
benefactor
.
This scenario of modernized authoritarianism is the most
realistic of the four in terms of PRI response to loss of
hegemony, in terms of its domestic palatability , Mexican
political opposition would be forced to assume a less
desirable and more controlled role, but one which it might
find preferable to the obvious alternatives of political
closure or immobilism. The international reaction to increased
authoritarianism would also be far less strident than to
either of the previous two scenarios. This scenario would also
best the previous two in its ease of execution. Assuming the
PRI government implements the four factors of this scenario
prior to the election or imminent election of a non-PRI
presidential candidate, the political costs need not be
prohibitive. On the likelihood of the PRI actually resorting
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to a modernized authoritarianism, :orneiius and Craicr comment,
There is virtually no evidence to suggest that the
majority of PRI leaders accept the idea that their party
will sease to be the "party of the state, " much less cease
to be the governing parry. They may endorse a political
opening, but (only) without real risk of losing power."'
This scenario is also the most likely in that the PRI would
not only face diminished political opposition from alternate
parties, but also from the military. Prudent implementation of
:
. modernized authoritarian model would not only decrease
pressure from the civil sector, but also from a disaffected
military with potentially political aspirations. The armed
forces could be relied upon for their support of the PRI
government, providing troops and weapons were not needed to
impose a continued PRI presidency on an unwilling
constituency. In terms of maintaining the loyalty of a
subordinated military, this scenario remains both more
reasonable and more likely to occur than either immobiiism or
political closure.
D. LIMITED POWER SHARING
This is the most liberal of the four scenarios, and as
such would allow for the greatest implementation of democratic
reform. Cornelius and Craig refer to the Indian Congress Party
Cornelius and Craig, p. 119
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model in their explanation of limited power sharing, implying
a willingness to surrender control of municipal and state
governments routinely ro the rightist or leftist
opposition in their regional strongholds, in the interest
Df staying in power at Che national level.'' 4
In this scenario, full political participation would be
encouraged for opposition candidates and representatives at
the local and state levels. Free and fair elections would
permit the selection of opposition hopefuls to any elected
seat below the national level. George Philip takes this
scenario one step further in his study of Mexico's presidency
when he insists that
real political concessions. . . have now accumulated to the
point where the inner structures of the Mexican state are
under pressure as never before. Development of genuinely
competitive democracy is, now, a real option.'"
Philip foresees major changes in Mexico's political power
balance, but does not include the military as a player in this
impending shift.
134 Ibid.
Philip, p. 173. This observation is in keeping with the
rest of his chapter, "The Presidency and Political Change." This
author believes Philip is overly optimistic for the success of a
truly pluralistic democracy in Mexico, and in expecting the PRI
leadership to readily accept loss of the presidency, perhaps as
early as 1994. p. 176.
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Limited power sharing would serve to maintain PRI control
of "he presidency, much as che modernized authoritarian
scenario prescribed, but without; the local and regional
control mechanisms implicit in that model. This control could
be maintained through a plurality of votes, however, rather
than having to rely on a majority. Several distinct factors of
this scenario are noteworthy.
The first factor of limited power sharing would be its
provision for regional differences in levels of PRI support,
and accordingly for variances in levels of opposition support:
as well. In this scenario local, state, and congressional
leaders would be freely elected and serve as fully integrated
members of the government. As such it is the most inclusionary
of the four scenarios, and therefore the most representative
of the goals and ideals of the Mexican Revolution. This does
not, however, make this fourth scenario the most likely PRI
response to a loss of hegemony. It does not sufficiently
consider the legacy of authoritarianism inherent in Mexico's
modern federal, state, and local government, nor does it weigh
the desire for self-preservation intrinsic to the PRI.
The Mexican army, divided into districts which cover the
Republic, has built into its structure sufficient autonomy to
deal with regional disparities in PRI affiliation and support.
Its district commanders may not hold public office, but they
are powerful citizens nonetheless. In this scenario elections
are held freely and regularly, and the military is not
considered a contender. In reality, however, the reaction of
che leadership of the armed forces to such elections,
especially when it became apparent that PRI representation ac
che national level would be insufficient to maintain a
plurality within Congress, would be significant . It is not
unreasonable to consider an increased political role for the
armed forces in certain scaces and locales where voter support
could thus be influenced.
A second factor of this scenario is che inevitability of
increased competition between political parties, including the
PRI, for voter support . This should breed increased levels of
sensitivity to voter needs by the elected representatives and
a more responsive government. As competition fosters
responsiveness, so responsiveness would foster democratic
reform within the PRI. This scenario of limited power sharing,
therefore, is self-defeating. Long-term, it does not allow for
the denigration of PRI control, but would provide (temporary)
political capital for apparent steps toward the loss of PRI
hegemony. Meanwhile, " ( t ) he Mexican regime's longstanding
legitimacy and stability has required better- than-average
economic growth levels,"'- but has been unable to maintain
Riordan Roett. "Mexico and the United States: Managing the
Relationship." Mexico and the United States:. Managing the
Relar.i nnship Riordan Roett (ed) . (Westview Press, Boulder; 1988.)
p. 8.
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such economic or political progress throughout the 1930s. This
nas added to the decline in legitimacy of the party, which has
responded by increasin r lemocratic initiatives in hopes :f
shoring up its sagging mandate.
The military's response to the democratic reforms inherent
in this model can be predicted as negative. Because Df the
local and state emphasis in this scenario, increased political
activism by regional leaders of the military could be expected
in response to decreases in PRI support, although this
activism would probably neither be shared nor condoned at the
national level
.
The third apparent factor is the resulting PRI dominance
as opposed to hegemony. Some would contend this level of power
sharing has already been achieved, and indeed, in several
Mexican states it has. Eventually, however, the inability of
the PRI to share its ultimate authority, the presidency, would
ultimately prove the downfall of this scenario.
The military's reaction to the increasingly embattled PRI
federal government would most likely be an increased distance
between the two institutions, rather than an increased
political activism on the part of the leadership of the armed
forces. Mexico's military is ill-equipped to assist its PRI
benefactor in hastening its downfall from hegemony to
dominance. The armed forces would probably support the more
conservative factions of PRI leadership which seek to maintain
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their preeminent position.
verail, the factors of limited power sharing are slowly
taking shape and form under the increasing political reforms
of the Salinas administration. The first factor is regional
variances in PRI support, followed by increased competition
and contestation between the FRI and political opposition,
which are 6ilready apparent. Third is the resulting shift from
PRI hegemony to dominance. The PRI leadership at large,
however, is likely to prove more conservative than the
President has, and the military would probably support a
moderate reversal along the political continuum toward
modernized authoritarianism. The centralist system, focused on
the PRI presidency, which has been perpetuated for over 60
years in the name of the Revolution, will not retain
sufficient political power to maintain the nation's focus if
the limited power sharing model continues. The scenario is
self-defeating, as it allows for opposition participation to
a point, but then denies PRI opponents full entrance to the
political system.
These four scenarios, ranging from the gridlock of
immobilism to the economic and social breakdown of political
closure, from the modernization of the PRI authoritarian
government to the relatively liberal limited power sharing,
are representative of the options facing the PRI as it meets
the challenge of losing its political hegemony. This crisis
could present icself within the next twenty years, and could
climax in the election, or near-election of a non-PRI
candidate to the Mexican presidency.
Currently the Mexican system lies somewhere between the
factors of modernized authoritarianism and limited power
sharing, and is probably closer to the latter. As the threat
of a non-PRI president becomes reality, however, the PRI
leadership will be forced to confront options for its
political future. Looking at the party's historic and recent
record in dealing with its opposition, it is apparent the PRI
will probably not allow its final vestige of power to be taken
away. This is what makes the study and projection of military
responses to the PRI alternatives so crucial. It is most
likely that the PRI political machine will attempt to move
backward along the power continuum until it reaches a level of
modernized authoritarianism which the public will bear. The
willingness of the military to support the PRI in the
imposition of this retrenchment depends on the combination of
factors and level of repression required.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. -MEXICAN RELATIONS
What 13 che military's effect ~jn Mexico's domestic and
foreign policies? Is it adequately prepared 10 assure
Mexico's stability ?.nd security? How would it behave in
the event of a serious political or foreign policy crisis?
In ordinary, tranquil times these questions can be
neglected. But when turns of events arouse U.S. concerns
about Mexico's stability, security, and policy behavior -
as has been the case for some time now - it becomes
important to update and reassess our meager knowledge
about the Mexican military. 1 '"
The issue of political stability for Mexico is paramount
as the world enters a new, post -Cold War era. Yet stability
need not mean perpetuation of the status quo. Mexico's
involvement in twentieth century politics has consistently
reflected its commitment to selective and measured response.
Social stability and order have always been, and will continue
to be, the driving force behind U.S. foreign policy,
especially regarding those nations with which we share common
borders
.
Internally, the inevitable loss of sovereignty that
accompanies the lessening of border restrictions and
(voluntary) subordination to a mutually-agreed, bi-partisan
David Ronfeldt. "The Modern Mexican Military: A Time for
Reassessment." Armies and Politics in Latin America . Abraham F.
Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (eds). (Holmes and Meier, New York;
1986.) pp. 224-225.
authority (Trade boards) will cause friction between Mexico's
economics-driven, cscnico-led government and its conservative
military forces. The nation's political stability will be an
essential factor in the implementation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, "which is central to the Mexican
government's new export -oriented development strategy.
"
i3d The
five factors reviewed in Chapter IV could conceivably cause
Mexico to undergo a military re-polit icizat ion in the 1990s.
While this is considered relatively unlikely, the possibility
cannot be discounted: Mexican society is moving at a rate and
in a political direction which is not likely to be sanctioned
by the armed forces. The next 2 years will provide a true
test of the strengths of prof essionalization and subordination
achieved over the past 5 years.
A. U.S. INFLUENCE
In the past Mexico.
. . perceived its national interests and
policy objectives not only as not complementary but also
at times as directly in conflict with those of the United
States. That perception was rooted in a century and half
of military, economic, and political conflict with its
northern neighbor, as well as in the obvious uneven
distribution of power that continues to characterize the
Mexican-U.S. relationship today.' '
Cornelius and Craig (1991.) p. 118.
Sally Shelton-Colby
. "Mexico and the United States: A New
Convergence of Interests." Mexico's External Relations in the
1990s
.
Riordan Roett (ed) . Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.
p. 232.
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The U.S. history 3i military intervention in Mexico is
well-known, from the annexation ?r 40 percent: if Mexican
territory in 1348 to the 1914-17 invasion of Veracruz by U.S.
President Woodrow Wilson's troops in what: was termed "an
affair of honor." 14 The U.S. role has been less dramatic
since, and today occupies a diminished role as either military
threat or influence. Since shortly after the end of World War
II, U.S. focus throughout Latin America has been shaped by the
Cold War, and has sought to maintain its hegemony as first
outlined in the Marshall Flan, in the early Cold War years,
communist: containment fervor colored U.S. perceptions of
Mexico. Instabilities throughout the region were blamed not on
internally instigated nationalism but were viewed by the
United States as "the direct result of external Soviet-block
instigation" which had to be defeated by " curtail ( ing) the
alleged expansionism of the Soviet Union." 141
The Mexican military was significantly influenced by the
proximity and strength of the United States armed forces after
• 4:
' Eric Efram Matos. "United States National Security and the
Republic of Mexico." (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
Ca; 1983.) Unpublished, pp. 28-29. Matos cites Robert E. Quirk, An
Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the occupat ion of Vera Cruz.
(W.W. Norton Press, New York: 1967.)
141 Heraldo Munoz. "The Latin American Policy of the Reagan
Administration." Latin American Views of tt.s. Policy. Robert Wesson
and Heraldo Munoz ( eds ) . ( Praeger Publishers, New York; 1986.) p.
6.
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1941. Previous inspiration had understandably been provided by
the Spanish in the early 'ears following Mexico's
independence, and the French had inspired most of its 19th
century rnodernizat ion . nevertheless, after 1917 and the end of
the Revolution,
Mexico developed on very distinctive national lines, its
military forces being as uniquely Mexican as its other
national institutions. US military assistance during the
Second World War and afterwards inevitably caused an
increase in the influence of the United States which had
hitherto been minimal. ;_
The signing of the Joint U.S. -Mexican Defense Agreement
shortly after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in
December, 1941, ushered in a new era of co-operation between
the two militaries. Some bases were shared for the training of
troops, and some $40 million in military aid was delivered by
the United States to enhance Mexican military readiness. The
program faded after the war, however, and little remained of
the Joint Defense Commission by 1950, although "Mexico
continued to send troops to the United States for training,
and United States influence appeared in the organizational
structure of the Mexican forces. ""
In the years since, little direct influence has been
142 English, p. 322.
Robert Wesson. "Foreign Influences." In Wesson, p. 74
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exerted by the American military on the structure of the
Mexico '3 military, :uia the country's armed forces have
maintained their "independent and nationalist spirit"." 4 Munn
states correctly that "(b)oth the internal and external
evidence lead one to assert that the Mexican army does not
respond in knee-jerk fashion to U.S. influence."" For
example, Mexico alone refused the U.S. offer to enter into a
defense assistance pact, while seven other Latin American
nations accepted."' Opposing sides were taken by the United
States and Mexico concerning the overthrow of Guatemalan
President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, and Mexico condemned the U.S.
embargo of Cuba shortly after Castro's takeover in 1959,
"provok(ing) considerable exasperation in Washington." 147
Mexico also condemned U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Panama as immoral and
self -serving
.
In recent years the United States, always viewed
by the Mexican military as both its protector and the greatest
threat to its national security, has largely exerted leverage
through its provision of professional and graduate level
training for Mexican officers. The proximity of the U.S. has
144 Ibid. p. 74.
145 Nunn in Ronfeldt (1984). p. 40.
:4b Wesson, p. 74.
Bruce Michael Bagley. "Interdependence and U.S. Policy
Toward Mexico in the 1980s." In Roett (1988). p. 223.
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undoubtedly contributed heavily to Mexico's commitment "to
avoid foreign military influences." This caution in building
military (or political, alliances extends to a reluctance to
participate in joint operational exercises or other iirect
professional contact which continues to the present day."1-5
1. Mexican Defense Industry Autonomy
In terms of arms production, indicative of self-
reliance or dependence on foreign militaries, since World War
II Mexico has sought to maintain autonomy from U.S. influence,
especially in small arms production. Although the total unit
production of certain systems is relatively low, and the cost
per unit therefore higher when relying on domestic
manufacturing, the Mexican military and PRI government have
felt it prudent to preserve their independence from the United
States and other foreign (British, French) arms industries. 150
Despite the inherently low level of domestic demand,
Mexico has actively maintained its own defense industry since
the Revolution, not wishing to be beholden to outside
technology or shipments from abroad. "No one country may be
' English, p. 322. Also see Gabriel Szekely. "Forging a North
American Economy: Issues for Mexico in the 1990s." In Roett (1988).
p. 232.
See Zinser's essay in Goodman, Mendelson and Rial.
Wesson, pp. 73-75, and Pineyro in Varas , pp. 115-117,
provide further analysis of the Mexican arms industry and their
reliance on foreign sales for procurement of both platforms and
weapon systems.
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said to have a monopoly :f the Mexican defence material
market. "- : - Even with a negligible -nance of foreign conflict,
the state and military have acted prudently to protect the
nation' 3 defense industry from what they consider to be -.indue
external influence. Since " f) r the foreseeable future, the
Mexican armed forces appear to be destined to remain limited
to (an) internal security role, "' the maintenance of an
indigenous defense industrial base may prove more costly in
the long-run than perhaps it need have. Had a closer
relationship been forged with rhe rjnited States, Brazil, or
other leader in arms lechnoiogy, Mexico could have spent
significantly less on arms. With the absence of external
conflicts on the horizon, the concern to prevent a foreign
actor from domination of Mexico's limited arms industry
appears from the U.S. perspective to have been overstated.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF DESTABILIZATION
The historically negative view of the United States taken
by the Mexican government and its military forces must be
changed if future relations between the two nations are to
focus on economic cooperation and political trust. Meanwhile,
the long history of U.S. intervention continues to shape
151 English, p. 321
152 Ibid. p. 322
93
Mexico's foreign and domescic policies. '" :
Mexico is most likely co continue a course of action
designed to keep incorporation of public interests cencral to
its doctrine. Not only is chis in keeping with the traditions
of che Revolution, but it also will allow Mexico co benefit
from an increasingly close political and economic relationship
with the United States. Assuming Mexico is able co maintain
stability and slowly cransicion co a more pluralistic
political system,
What will be different in the future will be the
relationship with Che United States - whose government
will have much less inceresc in milicary-co-military
relations , ^
and a correspondingly increased interest in economic ones.
The United States ' reaction to each of Cornelius and
Craig's four scenarios would be different. While political
closure would not be considered an acceptable alternative to
the U.S. government, and Che predicced Mexican military
response equally distasteful, the economic crisis prompting
the implementation of closure is the most worrisome factor
For a more detailed analysis of Mexico's foreign policy in
Central America and Che Caribbean, please see Che author's recent
essay as previously noted.
Mark Falcoff. "Latin America After the Cold War." Latin
Americ a: U.S. Policy After Che Cold War . Douglas W. Payne, Mark
Falcoff, and Susan Kaufman Purcell. (Washington, D.C: America's
Society, 1991 . ) p. 34.
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north of the border. A remilitarization of Mexico under these
circumstances touid well i e :ountered with a reenactment of
earlier interventions, r;.s :he rJ.S. might resort to
increasingly extreme measures to preserve what it perceives to
be. lapsing Mexican stability.
The United .States would also react negatively to an
immobiiism in Mexican politics. The potential for a renewed
political activism on the part of the armed forces, however,
could be the most reliable factor to break the stalemate. In
such a case the military would not be viewed as intervening on
its own behalf, but rather to restore a functioning
government. This scenario might therefore be tolerated, under
watchful eyes and in the short-term, by Washington.
A modernization of PRI authoritarianism would prove
considerably more tolerable to the United States than the
previous two scenarios. Its inherent broadening of political
competition, albeit without risking serious political defeat,
makes this scenario the closest of the four to Mexico in the
1990s. Relations between the two countries are increasing on
all levels, and this apertura is unlikely to be slowed by
issues such as democratic reform as long as Mexico is
perceived as moving toward the western democratic model.
The fourth scenario, limited power sharing, is the most
attractive of these likely PRI options for the United States.
While the PRI is unwilling to relinquish the presidency even
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in this model, this scenario divides political power among the
elected freely at local and state levels. It is an unlikely
iternative in the long-run, as it is politically self-
defeating. In the short-term, however, it is an appealing
choice, both for the united States in terms of seeing
something close to full democracy realized in Mexico, and to
the PRI
, which would benefit greatly from renewed political
capital
.
Tensions are inherent in all relations. The U.S. -Mexican
relationship is no different, nor is Mexico's civil-military
alliance. The relations Mexico has developed in this second
area represent a very different type of association than the
United States maintains, but in reality the Mexican and U.S.
militaries have far more in common than either shares with the
majority of Latin American militaries. It is these
commonalities which will assist in the strengthening of
relations between Mexico and the United States. Both nations
must use this common ground to keep the lines of communication
open between the two governments, despite the options which
may be chosen by the PRI.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This thesis has presented ind evaluated four political
alternatives for the future of Mexico's PRI and
professionalized, depolit icized military. It has argued that
while the Mexican armed forces have shunned an active role in
politics for over 5 years, their continued reliance on the
PRI government for power and prestige cannot remain
unchallenged indefinite!:/. It has also demonstrated that when
political change occurs, as it almost surely will within the
next 20 years, the military will be left without its
benefactor, and will be pressured to seek a new, more active
role in the country's politics.
This thesis has also analyzed many of the challenges which
will be faced by the Mexico's armed forces as the country's
ruling party of 60 years loses its hegemonic position to
growing political opposition. This transition from preeminence
to dominance will severely strain the military's tradition of
loyalty both the PRI and to the nation, and the military will
be pressured to take on a more dynamic political role with the
demise of its benefactor. This thesis has focused on the
political role of Mexico's military, demonstrating through the
application of Cornelius and Craig's four scenarios that
Mexico's armed forces will resist the temptation to
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repoliticize despite internal ana external coercion.
latin American civil -mill nary Literature was reviewed and
applied to the rase :r Mexico, followed by a brief history of
the Mexican Revolution and the early post-Revolutionary
political profile of military leadership. This laid the
groundwork for an analysis of both Mexico's potential for and
probability of military intervention as the PRI loses
political hegemony.
By modifying and applying Cornelius and Craig's four
scenarios for political transition to the Mexican military,
this thesis has analyzed the scenarios in considerable detail.
Each scenario has been broken into its basic factors and the
military response to each factor predicted.
The first scenario, Political Closure, remains extremely
unlikely. Its inherent economic crisis through failure of the
modern, open-market model make the political and social costs
of political closure too high for even an intractable PRI
leadership. This scenario will remain an extremely
unattractive alternative, though the most plausible condition
for a military repolit icization
.
The factors leading to Immobilism make it a somewhat more
plausible scenario. Characterized by political impasse and a
government freeze, immobilism effectively stalemates both the
PRI and opposition parties. This scenario increases the
likelihood of renewed military activism in Mexico, but its
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probability, coo, will remain relatively remote.
Modernized Authoritarianism, rhe third scenario, is the
most likely PRI response to loss dz the presidency.
Characterized by PRI retrenchment, it would result in a
revitalized PRI, but would throw the military into a ciuandary.
Their most likely response would be to support the PRI unless
tasked to physically repress a recalcitrant public. While this
thesis establishes modernized authoritarianism as the most
plausible government response to the situation posed, it also
demonstrates that military repoiit icizat ion becomes more
likely in the face of political retrenchment. This scenario
presents the most likely set of PRI and military responses to
an increasingly threatened PRI presidency.
The fourth and last scenario, Limited Power Sharing,
proposes political reforms to allow full opposition
representation in local and state assemblies, in order to
ensure continued PRI hegemony at the national level. This
self-defeating scenario carries little increased threat of a
military reactivation in Mexican politics.
This thesis has addressed the Mexican military's projected
reactions to both democratic reform and political stability as
the next 20 years pose a myriad of social, political and
economic changes. Unlike so many of her Latin American
neighbors, Mexico's armed services have served in an extra-
political role for over 40 years, and have little desire to
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regain political office. How PRI party leadership chooses to
respond to its impending loss of preeminence will, however,
influence the future political role of the country's armed
forces. For its part, the military leadership will work to
ensure a continued depoliticized military with loyalties to
both the Constitution and the Republic, but probably with
decreased personalist ic fealty Co the President of Mexico. The
long-term symbiotic relationship between the military and the
PRI president has provided Mexico's government a strong and
loyal right arm to keep order and enforce its policies, while
the military has maintained prestige and power without
sacrificing professional integrity through political activism.
Despite a negligible international military role, Mexico's
armed forces have professionalized and maintain a viable
domestic military presence, contributing to their unique
character
.
This thesis has assessed the impending threat to this
subordinated role, and briefly addressed the danger posed by
the emergence of new and unconventional military threats. The
commitment of Mexico's armed services to support the civil
government and its evasion of an active political role is, and
probably shall remain, unique. Those situations which could
conceivably move the Mexican military to abandon its
subordinate role have been discussed within the framework of
Davies
' Relative Deprivation model and applied to Cornelius
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and Craig's four scenarios for political transition. From
rhese scenarios, it is apparent chat a renewed political role
tor the Mexican armed forces will remain unlikely unless the
PRI
,
;r elements of the party leadership, threaten military
subordination by attempting to utilize the armed forces to
forcibly retain their hold on the presidency. Too many
variables will serve to keep the military sufficiently
satisfied with its current, internal role and out of
government power. The levels of advanced education, esprit de
corps, and loyalty to the ideals of the Revolution will retain
the fealty of the leadership of Mexico's armed forces to the
Constitution of the Republic. In the end, it is evident that
the probability of a military re-politicization in Mexico is,
and shall remain, relatively remote.
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